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FOREWORD
This report was prepared by the Man Systems Division of the URS/Matrix
Company under Contract No. NAS8-25627, Modification No. 15, "An Evaluation
of the ATM Man/Machine Interface - Phase 3, Analysis of SL-3 and 4 Data", for
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, George C. Marshall Space
Flight Center. The technical direction was provided by Mr. Lloyd B. Gardner
(COR), Man/Systems Integration Branch, EL15. This report is the summary of
the technical effort extending from May 24, 1974, to December 15, 1974. These.
contract results are documented in two volumes: Vol. I, the Executive Summary,
and Vol. II, this Technical Report.
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SECTION 1.0
INTRODUCTION
Presented in this report are discussions of the approach, the results and the
conclusions of a study designed to assess past operations of a control console for a
complex on-orbit manned system, with the expressed goal of applying these findings
to the design and development of future on-orbit control and display systems. The
report documents the activities and findings of Phase 3 of an overall study program
to evaluate the effectiveness of the Skylab/ATM control/display system.
1.1 SKYLAB/ATM BACKGROUND
Launched in 1973, Skylab was the United States' first manned space station.
This vehicle was capable of supporting prolonged manned missions with program
objectives related to study of the earth, the sun, man and space technology. The
station was manned for a total of 171 days in three periods (SL-2, 28 days; SL-3,
59 days; and SL-4, 84 days).
On Skylab, the sun was the subject of intensive investigation by a manned
solar observatory -- the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) . The ATM consisted of
an integrated set of eight telescopes to observe, monitor and record the structure
and behavior of the sun and its corona. It also included the necessary guidance
and navigation systems for attitude control and telescope alignment, thermal
conditioning systems and electrical power systems.
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Of the total man-hours spent on Skylab (11,918), approximately 8% of the
time was spent in solar observations. Instead of the 880 planned man-hours of
investigation, the crews actually spent 941, as shown in the table below (this
excludes 156 man-hours spent on SL-4 for the Comet Kohoutek).
Table 1-1: Solar Observation Time Per Manned Period
MANNED MAN-HOURS % OF
PERIOD UTILIZED TOTAL
SL-2 117 6.0
SL-3 305 7.8
SL-4 519 8.5
TOTAL 941
Of the nearly 12,000 man-hours of orbital time, over 3,000 were spent in scien-
tific investigation, with approximately 940 man-hours (or 30%) devoted to solar
observations. Overall scientific investigation time is summarized in the following
table.
Table 1-2: Scientific Investigation Per Manned Period
CORRELARY, SOLAR
STUDENT & OBS.
MANNED SOLAR EARTH COMET TOTAL % OF TOTAL
PERIOD MEDICAL OBS. RESOURCES KOHOUTEK PERIOD PERIOD
SL-2 145 117 71 65 398 29
SL-3 312 305 224 244 1085 28
SL-4 337 419 274 503* 1633 32
TOTALS 794 941 569 812 3116 30
*Includes 156 man-hours spent in Comet Kohoutek using ATM equipment.
1-2
1.1.1 ATM Configuration
The ATM cluster consisted of the following instruments covering wave-
lengths ranging from 2 - 6,500 Angstroms (including two targeting telescopes
operating in the Hydrogen-Alpha wavelength):
* Hal and 2 Telescope
* White Light Coronagraph (S052)
* X-Ray Spectrographic Telescope (S054)
* UV Scanning Polychromator/Spectroheliometer (S055A)
* X-Ray Telescope (S056)
a XUV Coronal Spectroheliograph (S082A)
* UV Spectrograph (S082B)
These instruments sensed various solar phenomena and converted them to
solar images, line spectra and photometrics, which were converted to a video
presentation, recorded on film, recorded on tape, or telemetered to the ground.
The ATM was mounted on the orbital assembly such that both it and its
solar panels were directed toward the sun during solar observations. The
control console for this observatory cluster was located in the Multiple Docking
Adapter (MDA), a cylinder 10 feet in diameter and 17 feet long, mounted to the
Airlock Module (AM) above the Orbital Assembly (OA) . In addition to the ATM
control crew station, the MDA also housed the Earth Resources Experiment
Package (EREP), the Materials Processing Facility, and miscellaneous experiment
storage. The console was located just forward of the MDA/AM interface.
1.1.2 ATM Control/Display Console
This integrated control/display console was originally designed for seated
operation in the Lunar Module (LM) in an earlier Skylab cluster configuration.
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Later in the program, however, it was relocated to the MDA, and the crew
elected to operate it from a standing position. This crew station consisted of
the ATM Console, the Foot Restraint Platform (Astrogrid), a Skylab Restraint
Assembly (a chair, used only by the SL-2 crew) and a Speaker Intercom Assembly
(see Figure 1-1). The restraint platform was adjustable to accommodate variations
in the total crew (5th - 95th percentile range).
Figure 1-1: Solar Observatory Console (ATM) Crew Station
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As illustrated in Figure 1-2, this complex console contained the controls and
displays for seven solar experiments, instrument cluster pointing control, elec-
trical power monitoring and control, attitude and stability, two video monitors,
etc. The console contained over 1700 square inches of panel space on two planes.
The experiment portion of the panel alone housed 96 switches and 37 displays
of various types. Each experiment had scientific as well as hardware monitoring
status parameters which were measured and telemetered to the ground stations.
For example, S082A had 130; S054 had 68. These data were used as inputs to
the study.
In order to effectively and efficiently use this complex console in an
integrated fashion, various procedure systems were developed called Joint
Observing Programs (JOPs) . These JOPs (e.g., Program No. 3 - Flares, and
No. 14 - Solar Eclipse) enabled instruments to collectively observe solar phenomena.
The JOPs consisted of various combinations of intrument configurations, or "Building
Blocks" (BBs), thus providing flexibility in selecting the data acquisition method
for a particular solar investigation. The JOPs performed on orbit yeilded a volumin-
ous amount of excellent telemetered and film data on solar phenomena.
1.2 PREVIOUS CONTRACT EFFORTS
1.2.1 Phase 1 Activities
In preparation for the assessment of the ATM control/display station inter-
face, the ATM control panel and panel operating procedures were examined to
determine what data would be required to reconstruct the panel's operation,
post-mission. The projected ATM telemetry measures were then examined to
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Figure 1-2: ATM Console Control Panels
determine whether the required measures were available, and, upon finding that
they were, those that were appropriate to the study were requested.
1.2.2 Phase 2 Activities
In this phase, a compilation of baseline ground data suitable for statistical
analysis, a preliminary analysis of SL-2 on-orbit data, and a preliminary statis-
tical comparison of the baseline ground data and the on-orbit data were generated.
The results obtained from comparisons of ground ,based and on-orbit data showed
that the same types of errors made during one-g simulations were also made
during the on-orbit panel operations.
The findings of the Phase 2 report (Ref. Appendix A), based on an analysis
of the SL-2 ATM operations, were:
* The left side of the panel had a higher deviation (error) rate than
the right side.
* Three-position toggle switches (F-F-F) used without a display had a
high deviation rate.
* Experiment modes that required manual timing by the crewmen were
often timed improperly.
* Many of the deviations which occurred during operation of S082B
involved confusion with S082A ("B" was set up to "A" specifications).*
* Building Blocks with several subsections separated by pointing commands
had high deviation rates for the centermost subsections.
*This was postulated to be due to similarities in controls/displays labeling
nomenclature, and BB instructions. For SL-3/4, large red and blue decal
letters "A" and "B" and red and blue boundaries (taped strips) were applied
to experiments in an attempt to alleviate confusion and, thus, reduce error
rates.
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* Isolated control actuations had a much higher deviation rate than
sequential control actuations.
1.2.3 Applications to Future Missions
Added to the Phase 2 effort was a task to develop a preliminary set of
design recommendations, based on the analysis of the deviations in SL-2 panel
operation.
Since the operations performed on the ATM console are similar to those
projected for the Space Shuttle payloads, the considerations derived from this
effort should have direct application for the development of payload control
station design criteria and guidelines. These design recommendations are sum-
marized below:
* The number of subsystems (experiments) controlled from the panel's
left side should be no greater than the number of subsystems controlled
from the right side, assuming similar control/display requirements
(control and display density).
* The number of time-phased subsections of Building Blocks should be
minimized (preferably four or less).
* Three-position toggle switches (F-F-F) should have a visual display
for position indication.
* Experiments that require timing of experiment modes should have
dedicated integral timers.
* Isolated control actuations should be minimized. If necessary, they
should be accompanied by visual or audible displays, or should be
clearly defined in the panel operation procedure.
* If several subsystems (experiments) must be controlled from one panel,
similar experiment identification nomenclature (e.g., S082A, S082B)
should be avoided. Similar nomenclature for individual controls or
displays should also be avoided to prevent confusion, especially when
the subsystems are located near each other on the panel.
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These data were subsequently incorporated into MSFC-STD-512, Man/
System Design Criteria for Manned Orbiting Payloads.
1.3 ANALYSIS OF SL-3 AND SL-4 MISSION DATA (PHASE 3)
Although collection, reduction and analysis of SL-2 ATM panel operations
in Phase 2 produced preliminary design criteria applicable to future missions,
many of the panel operational problems could not be correlated with panel
design features due to an insufficient quantity of data samples (3 crewmen;
shortest SL manned mission length). To provide answers to many questions
left open by the SL-2 effort, and to increase the confidence level of the resulting
design recommendations, an additional effort to collect, reduce and analyze the
SL-3 and SL-4 data was undertaken.
1.3.1 Phase 3 Overall Goal and Study Objectives
The overall goal for the Phase 3 effort and, indeed, for the entire ATM Assess-
ment Program, is to update and improve human factors hardware design and proce-
dural guidelines, in order to contribute to improved future manned systems perform-
ance. The major objectives outlined and achieved toward that end, duri'g Phase 3,
were:
1) Completion of a comparison of Phase 2 results (SL-2 data) with results
obtained from the Phase 3 data analyses.
2) Identification of hardware design and procedural parameters contributing
to unacceptable ATM experiment system performance.
3) Development and presentation of design guidelines and recommendations
for overcoming the unacceptable performance identified in 2) above.
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4) Development of a concept and construction of a soft mockup of an optimized,
modular control panel envelope capable of accommodating either one or two
crew members using ATM component configurations, and being integrated
into future Space Shuttle payloads (e.g., Payload Specialist Station) .
In the original contract Scope of Work, results of ATM Assessment were to be
compared against future mission requirements. The outcome of that comparison was
to include identification and documentation of payload missions which would benefit
from the criteria and recommendations ensuing from the assessment study and presen-
tation of that information to payload mission designers as an aid to improve the man/
system interface. However, in lieu of performing that comparison, the contracting
officer directed that a statistical analysis of the data be performed. In accordance
with his direction, a statistical analysis was incorporated into the study and the
comparison dropped.
1.3.2 Description of SL-3 and SL-4 Crew and Crew Training
As in the previous manned mission (SL-2), the station was manned by three
crew members. Each mission included a Commander, a Scientist Pilot, and a
Pilot.
Although the scientist pilot (as his name implies) was responsible for the
scientific aspect of the mission, all of the crewmen were cross-trained and,
therefore', capable of operating the ATM console.
The crews were exposed to various levels and complexity of training for
their respective missions, as shown in Tables 1-3 and 1-4. Although the crew
for SL-4 had more time in which to prepare, due to their flight date being the
latest, they also had less time between the final stages of JOP development and
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flight date. An attempt was made to keep the workload for SL-4 the same as for
SL-3, but, with the added complexity of the mission (e.g., addition of investiga-
tion of the comet Kohoutek), the overall time between on-orbit operations was less,
thus creating greater ATM activity density for the SL-4 crew.
Table 1-3: Types and Length (in hours) of
Astronaut Training - Total ATM
TYPE SL-2 SL-3 SL-4
SL Simulator 286 419 431
Solar Physics Briefings 290 338 496Experiment Briefings 82 180 160MSFC Simulator 26 28.5 65
Table 1-4: Characteristics of JOP
CHARACTERISTICS SL-2 SL-3 S L-4
Original No. of JOPs 13 15 23
No. of Complex JOPs 8 13 18
No. of Late Modifications 3 2 8
Level of Late Modifications Moderately Very
Heavy Heavy
No. of "Shoppting List" 0 2 2
Time Between JOP Dev. and 3 1 - 2 <1
End of Training: (months)
1-11
1.4 PHASE 3 - REPORT OVERVIEW
The Phase 3 study delved into two independent data collections: 1) telemetry
data, and 2) voice transcript data. Statistical information about panel usage was
derived from telemetry. Due to the voluminous nature of the SL-3 and SL-4
telemetry data, a fixed interval sampling technique was employed in the selection
of mission time periods to be analyzed. The voice transcripts were reviewed to
document operational problems. In the analyses performed on those data, the
following types of factors were addressed in order to assess their effect on ATM
panel man/machine integration:
* Control and display component type
* Control and display location
* Operating procedures
* Time of operation in mission
* Panel layout
The methodology used to extract, analyze and test the compiled data is
documented in Section 2.0. The data analyses, results and conclusions for the
two data collections, as well as the results and conclusions of the hypothesis testing
are given in Section 3.0. Section 4.0 contains integrated study results, conclusions
and recommendations for future work.
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SECTION 2.0
METHODOLOGY
2.1 GENERAL APPROACH
The general approach taken in assessing the man/machine interface on SL-3
and SL-4 incorporated separate analyses of two types of data: .1) telemetry data,
and 2) critical incidents.noted in the missions' voice transcripts. (See Figure 2-1,
Overall Task Flow.) This double approach was used to obtain the most realistic
representation possible of the ATM man/machine system.
The telemetry data analysis employed a fixed-interval sampling technique
to review routine ATM operations. The critical incidents analysis augmented this
routine sampling with information derived from comments made by the flight crews
and ground support during and after periods of ATM operation. Subsequent to
separate reviews of the two bodies of amassed data, comparisons were made in
order to reveal areas of agreement or conflict. Each such area was discussed,
and the resulting conclusions were reported.
The overall result of the effort is a set of design recommendations suitable
for incorporation into future mission design. The discussion that follows describes
each major phase of the study, the assumptions made, the methods employed, and
the limitations established.
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TELEMETRY DATA ANALYSIS CONDUCT
CONDUCT
DESCRIPTIVE
CONDUCT I STATISTICAL
PREPARE ANALYSIS ANALYSIS
LOCATE SELECTION RETRIEVE OF TLM REPORT
TAPES & SAMPLING DATA VS RESULTS
PROCEDURE BUILDING PERFORM
BLOCKS FORMAL
HYPOTHESES
PREPARE ANALYSIS FORMAT
COMPARE RECONCILE REPORT DRAW PREPARE
RESULTS I DIFFERENCES -RESULTS I - CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS
CRITICAL INCIDENT ANALYSIS
REVIEW ALL
OBTAIN TRANSCRIPTS ANALYZE REPORT
TRANSCRIPTIONS TO IDENTIFY COMMENTS RESULTS
ATM COMMENTS
PREPARE ANALYSIS FORMAT
FIGURE 2-1: Study Task Flow Diagram
2.2 TELEMETRY DATA ANALYSIS
2.2.1 Data Point Selection
In order to identify periods of manned ATM experiment operation, the
Skylab Mission Events document (Ref. Appendix A) was reviewed. This docu-
ment describes the activities of each crew member throughout the Skylab 3 and 4
missions. After mission time and duration of each manned ATM operation were
identified, the data tapes containing the associated telemetry were located and
organized.
A computer program developed by NASA/MSFC during Phase 2 of this con-
tract was used to extract relevant data from the telemetry tapes. Certain infor-
mation available through telemetry channels appeared to contain useful measures
of man/machine performance. A list of the readouts for each ATM experiment is
given in Table 2-1. The distribution of components corresponding to each readout
and the layout of the ATM control and display panel, as it was flown on SL-3 and
SL-4, is illustrated in Figure 2-2.
The ATM panel was selected for analysis for several reasons:
1. The panel represents the most sophisticated, integrated experiment
control panel ever used in manned space flight.
2. A considerable amount of data were telemetered to the ground to
assist ground-based scientists in planning observations.
3. The panel has undergone some man/machine study during the develop-
ment and verification process via man-in-the-loop simulation. Results
of these ground-based simulations were compared with on-orbit results
in an earlier study phase.
4. Some components of the panel represented novel applications of
previously used components, and some were entirely new components.
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Table 2-1: List of Readouts for Each ATM Experiment
Ha FR/MIN, 3-POS TOGGLE SW (F-F-F)
START-STOP, 3-POS TOGGLE SW (F-F-F)
S056 MODE, ROATRY SW, 11-POS
EXPSOURE SW, 3-POS TOGGLE (F-F-F)
FLARE ENABLE, 2-POS TOGGLE (F-F)
START-STOP, 3-POS TOGGLE (M-F-M)
S082A MODE, TOGGLE SW, 3-POS (F-F-F)
WAVELENGTH TOGGLE SW, 2-POS (M-F-M)
EXPOSURE TOGGLE SW, 2-POS (M-F-M)
START-STOP TOGGLE SW, 2-POS (M-F-M)
FLARE ENABLE TOGGLE SW, 2-POS (M-F-M)
S082B MODE, TOGGLE SW, 3-POS (F-F-F)
WAVELENGTH TOGGLE SW, 2-POS (M-F-M)
EXPOSURE TOGGLE SW, 2-POS (M-F-M)
START-STOP TOGGLE SW,' 2-POS (M-F-M)
FLARE ENABLE TOGGLE SW, 2-POS (M-F-M)
AUTO SEQ TOGGLE SW, 2-POS (F-F)
S052 MODE, ROTARY SW, 5-POS
START-STOP TOGGLE SW, 3-POS (M-F-M)
MIRROR POSITION TOGGLE SW, 3-POS (M-F-M)
S055A MODE, 7 DETECTORS, 3-POS TOGGLE SW (F-F-F)
ROTARY SW, 9 POS
START-STOP TOGGLE SW, 3-POS (M-F-M)
GRATING, 2-POS TOGGLE SW (F-F)
GRATING POSITION INDICATOR
S054 GRATING, 3-POS TOGGLE SW (F-F-F)
FLARE ENABLE, 2-POS TOGGLE SW (F-F)
START-STOP, 3-POS TOGGLE SW (M-F-M)
PICTURE RATE ROTARY SW, 4-POS
EXPOSURE RANGE ROTARY SW, 6-POS
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Figure 2-2: Location of Components Monitored in Analysis
The particular components chosen for print-out from the telemetry data
tapes were selected to meet certain criteria. Those criteria are listed here in
order of priority, with most important first:
1. The component was monitored and telemetered to the ground.
2. The component was involved in key portions of experiment operations.
3. The component complemented other telemetered components in distribut-
ing the selected hardware items throughout the experiment portion of
the control/display panel.
4. Data from the component could be used as a performance measure when
compared to established procedures.
5. The component complemented other components in distributing selected
hardware items across types of C/D hardware available on the panel.
From the tapes, data for selected periods of interest in SL-3 and SL-4
were printed out. By sampling every sixth building block from the PAAS
(Ref. Appendix A) document, the objective of sampling at fixed intervals throughout
the missions was satisfied. This procedure provided 273 total data points to be
analyzed. A sample sheet from the PAAS is shown in Figure 2-3 with relevant
operations marked.
A sample print-out sheet for one of the experiments is presented in
Figure 2-4. Referring to the figure, it can be seen that the print-out provides
accurate data on mission time for each operation related to that experiment.
2.2.2 Data Point Scoring
Scoring the telemetry data involved development of a procedure which reflected
awareness of several facts regarding the nature of the information.
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22021 947 55.81954205019542050** 43.50.0 0.02017 OBSERVING TIME
72022 948 55.82128222421282224 6 if 0.00.0 1.52129SC 55 MAPR 60
22023 948 55.8212822242128222426 0.03.0 5.52130LB1 CMIT82A,82e,54
22024 .949 55.8212822242128222426 0.03.0 5.52130LB 55 MAP DOET ALLGRAT 0000
22025 948 55.8212822242128222426 0.02.0 5.52139LB82 CMIT82A,828,54
22026 948 55.8212822242128222426 0.02.0 5.52139LB2 55 MAR DET ALLGRAT 0000
22027 949 55.8212822242128222426 10 0.02.0 5.52146L83 OMIT82A,828,54
22028 948 55.8212822242128222426 C.02.0 5.52146LB3 55 PAR DET ALLGRAT 0000
22029 948 55.8212822242128222426 0.02.0 5.52154L83 OMIT82A,828,54
22030 948 55.8212822242128222426 1 0.02.0 5.52154L83 55 MAR DET ALLGRAT 0000
-n 2'031 948 55.4Z~j.2242128222426 0 C.02.0 5.5j L84 CMIT82A,828,54
YP2032 948 55.8212822242128222426 C.02.0 5.52201L4 55 MAR DET ALLGRAT 0000
22033 948 55.8212822242128222426 10- 0.02.0 5.52209L84 CHIT82A,828,54
22034 948 55.8212822242128222426 0.02.0 5.52209L64 55 MAR DET ALLGRAT 0000
22035 948 55.82128222421282224** 2.00.0 0.02216 OBSERVING TIME
22036 948 55.82128222421282224 7 0.00.023.52218SC 828 OMIT
22037 948 55.821?8222421282224 7 0.00.023.52218SC 55 STOP OETALLGRAT 0000
22038 949 55.912 1235723012357 6 0.00.0 1.5 E2MSC 55 MAR C60
22039 949 55.930123572301235726 0.03.0 5.5225714 OMIT 82A,54
22040 949 55.9230123572301235726 1 0.03.0 5.5225714 826 EXP N
22041 949 55.9230123572301235726 1 0.03.0 5.5225714 OMIT 828 EXPZ-
22042 949 55.9230123572301235726 1 0.03.0 5.5225714 55 MAR OET ALLGRAT 1042
22043 949 55.9230123572301235726 0.02.0 5.5230514 OMIT 82A,54
22044 949 55.9230123572301235726 10 0.02.0 5.5230514 82B EXP N
22045 949 55.9230123572301235726 10 0.02.0 5.5230514 OMIT 82B EXP 2
-22046 949 55.923023572301235726 10 0.02.0 5.5230514 5 1659
, 22047 949 55.93Ti"23572301235726 8 0.03.016.5213I4 GMIT82A,52,54
3.5 22048 949 55.9230123572301235726 8 0.03.016.5231314 56 S FR 4 EXP 10:00
22049 949 55.9230123572301235726 8 0.03.016.5231314 OMIT 56 EXP 2
22050 949 55.9230123572301235726 8 0.03.016.5231314 828 WV ST EXP X4
22051 949 55.9230123572301235726 8 0.03.016.5231314 55 M3RDET12346GRAT 2434
22052 949 55.92301235723012357 2A 0.03.0 5.5233221 OMIT 828,54
22053 949 55.92301235723012357 2A g 0.03.0 5.5233221 55 MAR DET ALLGRAT 0000
22054 949 55.92301235723012357 2A 0.02.025.5234121
22055 950 55.80035013000350130 6 IA 0.00.0 6.50036SC 82A OMIT
22056 950 55.80035013000350130 6 lA 0.00.0 6.50036SC 55 MAR CET ALL&60
22057 950 55.8C035013000350130 6 1A 0.00.0 6.50036SC 55 GRAT 0617
22058 c50 55.80035013000350130 6 B 0.02.019.00042SC 54 GPAT IN
22059 950 55.80035013000350130 6 1, 0.02.019.00042SC 82A OMIT
22C60 950 55.80035013000350130 6 2 0.02.0 8.00103SC 82A OMIT
22061 950 55.8003501300035013012E 26 0.02.026.5011321 CMIT828,52,54
22062 950 55.8003501300035013012E 26 0.02.026.5011321 55 GRAT 00
22063 170
22064 951U55.8C208C3040280304 2A(UUI 0.00.017.0024821 52 DMIT
22065 951U55.80208030402080304 2AUUL 0.00.017,3024821 54 OMIT
22066 951U55.80208030402080304 2AUUI 0.00.017.0024821 55MARDET123467CI7
22067 951U55.80208030402080304 2AUUI 0.00.017.0024821 55 GRAT 0000
22068 952U56.00341043703410437 2AUUI 0.00c041.003412L 52 OMIT
22069 952U56.0C341043703410437 2AUUI 0.00.041.0034121 54 CMIT
22070 952U56.00341043703410437 2AUU1 0.00.041.0034121 55MAROET123467&60
22071 952U56.00341043703410437 2AUUI 0.00.041.0034121 55 GRAT 0000
22072 9521U56.00341043703410437 6 UUl 0.00.019.00422SC 54 OMIT
22073 952U56.00341043703410437 6 UUI 0.00.019.004225C 55MARDETI23467GRAT 0000
22074 953115580515061105150611 2AUUL 0.00.060.0051521 52 CMIT
22075 9531J55.80515061105150611 2AUU1 0.00.060.0051521 54 CMIT
22076 953U55.80515061105150611 2AUUI 0.00.060.0051521 55MAROET 12346&60
22077 9531U55.8C515061105150611 2AUUI 0.00.060.0051521 55 GRAT 2434
22078 9541155.80648074406480744 6 UUL 0.00.0 6.00648SC 54 FIL 3
22079 954U55.806480744C6480744 6 UUL 0.00.0 6.00o4dSC 5SMAROET 12346&60
22080 954U55.80648074406480744 6 UU1 0.00.0 6.006485C 55 GRAT 2434
22081 954U55.8C648074406480744 2AUUI 0.00.038.)0654PTl 52 OMIT
Figure 2-3: Sample Page from PAAS Document
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2.2.2.1 Data Limitations
The procedure used in scoring the telemetry data (Figure 2-5) included a
review of the computer print-outs, the Building Blocks, the voice transcripts, the
PAAS document, and the Mission Requirements Document (MRD) for each data point.
One of the major shortcomings of a retrospective analysis in an operational environ-
ment (as opposed to an experimental environment) , is the inability to control variables.
This problem manifested itself in the form of unwritten or unrecorded instructions.
The analysis reported here is based strictly on performance of the ATM system as
compared to updated Building Block instructions. Any "understood" procedures
which were not recorded in the mission documentation were not reflected in the
analysis. Consequently, if it was understood by the crew that operational times
stated for experiments were minimum times, not time limits, overrunning specified
times would be appropriate, while underunning would not be appropriate. In this
analysis, however, underrunning and overrunning were evaluated equally because
there were no stated instructions to indicate that missing the stated time was accept-
able.
Another case in which the problem of unrecorded instructions could have
prevailed is that of "understood" procedural deviations. For example, the S055A
experiment has a mode switch which allows three mirror raster scans or continuous
(auto) raster scans. An understood procedure may have applied in which three
rasters at any selected site were adequate. Consequently, by selecting the three-
raster mode when formal instructions dictated selection of auto raster, the crewman
avoided having to manually terminate the mode. This could have afforded additional
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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS DATA POINT SCORING PROCEDURE 15) Determine error opportunities:
15a for each ATM experiment In BB (ref. Step 11) note on a pad the control
1) Secure data point computer print-out. or display activity that must be performed.
2) Note mission time on print-out (ref. Step 1). 15b modify BB steps (ref. Step 15c) as per PAAS Instructions (ref. Step 14).
3) Secure voice transcripts covering data point performance times (+ 1 hr.; 15c refer to voice transcripts (ref. Step 3).
ref. Step 2).
15d update modified BB activity (ref. Step 15b) as per voice transcripts.
4) Secure PAAS document.
15e refer to computer print-out (ref. Step 1) -- modified and updated BB
5) Secure MRD for appropriate mission (SL3 or SLQ) activities (ref. Step 15d) that can be checked via telemetry data for
occurrence of errors will be considered error opportunities.
6) Secure ATM experiments description summary document.
16) Enter error opportunities (ref. Step 15e) on score sheet (ref. Step 8).
7) Secure ATM C&D panel schematic.
16a for each control and display error opportunity (ref. Step S5e), check
, 8) Secure 1 ea. raw data score sheet. ATM C&D panel schematic (ref. Step 7) to determine associated hardware
type.
1, 9) Refer to data point print-out (ref. Step 1) and complete Information across
top of score sheet (ref. Step 8; e.g., data pt # , JOP # , etc.). 16b enter one mark for each error opportunity In appropriate score sheet cell.
10) Determine data point BB number (ref. Step 9). 16c while performing Step 16b, note whether error opportunity Is sequential
or single operation and place dot in appropriate score sheet cell.
11) Find BB number (ref. Step 10) bar chart in MRD document (ref. Step 5).
17) Score Errors
12) Note data point performance time (ref. Step 9).
17a From data print-out (ref. Step 1), check data point time of performance.
13) Refer to PAAS document (ref. Step 4)1. Find times that bracket performance
period (ref. Step 12) and that pertain to data point BB (ref. Step 10) . 17b Review the print-out data for the time of performance (ref. Step 17a)
and determine which control or display error opportunities (ref. Step ISe)
14) Record on a note pad special conditions (as presented In PAAS) for modifying actually resulted In errors.
BB ordered activity (ref. Step 11).
17c Determine error type and enter first letter of that type in appropriate
score sheet cell.
17d While performing Step 17c, note whether error Is sequential or single
generation and enter dot In appropriate score sheet cell.
Figure 2-5; Procedure for Scoring Telemetry Data
time for the crew to conduct other experiments without interruption.
As the data points were selected, it became apparent that the data tapes
available included only afternoon and evening operations (GMT 1200-2400 hours).
A concerted effort was made to obtain morning tapes, but it was discovered that, in
most instances, they were not even existent, due to limitations in ground taping
capacity during actual mission flight. After the missions, although the data for most
of the morning hours had been telemetered to the ground, MSFC's Skylab Office com-
puter time limitations did not allow transference of the information onto tapes which
could be programmed to print out ATM operations. The morning time periods were,
therefore, eliminated from the analysis.
2.2.2.2 Distribution of ATM Operations Intervals Analyzed
The fixed-interval sampling technique encompassed data points ranging
across most of SL-3 and SL-4 orbital time. Mission times from Day 219 to
Day 264 in SL-3 and from Day 331 to Day 398 in SL-4 were sampled. Of the
28 Building Blocks available for use in the SL-3, a total of 14 were exposed to
at least one analysis as a data point. Of 39 Building Blocks available for use
in SL-4, 19 were subjected to analysis. This distribution of data points across
Building Blocks is summarized in Table 2-2.
2.2.2.3 Building Blocks and Other Determinants of Scheduled Operations
The Building Blocks (BBs) were considered the primary procedures instru-
ments for Skylab ATM operations. A sample of these formats, BB #28, is presented
in Figure 2-6. As can be seen in the figure, the mode, exposure settings, start
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TABLE 2-2: Distribution of Building Blocks
Across Telemetry Data Analysis Data Points
SL-3 SL-4
BUILDING NUMBER OF BUILDING NUMBER OF
BLOCK DATA POINTS BLOCK DATA POINTS
NUMBER ANALYZED NUMBER ANALYZED
10 28 10 21
2 20 1 19
I 7 28 16
11 7 32 16
4 5 2 9
36 5 4 2
5 4 11 2
28 4 37 2
33 4 7 1
13 3 8 1
7 2 13 1
3 1 15 1
17 1 17 1
22 1 19 1
14 92 24 1
26 1
30 1
34 1
39 1
19 98
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time, duration, number of frames of data taken, etc., is shown for each experiment
operated in a selected Building Block. The clear or unshaded areas represent
periods of operation for each designated experiment.
Instructions given via the on-board teleprinter were recorded in the PAAS,
and were considered to supersede the Building Block procedures. Similarly,
verbal instructions discovered in the voice transcripts were considered to super-
sede any other instructions. Therefore, procedures indicated in the Building
Blocks as modified by the PAAS and/or the voice transcripts, were used as the
reference for intended operations. Actual experiment operations (as indicated
in the telemetry data print-outs) were compared with the expected operations
to identify errors or deviations. Each data point (total of 273) was scored
according to the procedure outlined in Figure 2-5, above. A sample Raw Data
Score Sheet used for reporting results on each data point is presented in
Figure 2.7.
2.2.2.4 Implementation of Data Scoring
One of the difficulties encountered in any analytical process is appropriately
defining ground rules, assumptions, terms, etc., relating to the analysis. It is
essential to the process to have clearly defined terms and supporting assumptions
for use by each member of an analytical team. Therefore, before implementation
of data scoring, operational definitions were developed for use by the analysts,
in order to assure uniformity of data interpretation. These operational defini-
tions, and several assumptions which were made prior to data analysis, are
presented in Figure 2-8.
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RAW DATA SCORE SHEET
DATA POINT # 1 05 JOP BB: MISSION TIME: M,- -
CONTROLS DISPLAYS CREW OPN ERROR TYPE
ERRORS COMMITTED
ERROR OPPORTUNITIES
Figure 2-7: ISample Raw Data Score Sheet
Operational Definitions:
1) Control - Hardware item that functions primarily to initiate a change of
status.
2) Display - Hardware item that functions primarily to provide operator with
information.
3) Control Error - Incorrect control positioning or incorrect control sequenc-
ing.
4) Display Error - Inappropriate performance of an operation dependent upon
information feedback apart from that provided by a control.
5)* Control Error Opportunity - Control action required by amended Building
Block instructions.
6)* Display Error Opportunity - Building Block ordered activity dependent
upon information feedback divorced from that provided by controls.
7) Single Operation - An operation separated from its related operations by
more than three other events or by more than one minute.
Assumptions:
1) initiate or terminate actions will be scored as display error opportunities
or as display errors when they are keyed to time or unrelated event cues.
2) The ATM Experiments Description Summary document will define equipment
operating modes.
3) An error opportunity exists only when sufficient telemetry data are provided
for analysts to determine Whether or not an error was committed.
*Refer to Assumption number three.
Figure 2-8: Statistical Analysis Operational
Definitions and Assumptions
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In exercising the analytical tools to develop forms, definitions and proce-
dures, it was discovered that, based on telemetry data, it is difficult to dis-
tinguish between control errors and display errors. For example, on the S055A
experiment, instructions were given to the crewmen to set the grating at a
pre-established reading. A digital readout was provided to indicate the grating
position. If the operator set the grating at 0112 instead of the instructed 0157,
is this the result of misreading the display or neglecting to initiate a stop
command to stop the grating scan at the appropriate time? In cases such as this,
the error was classified as a display error. By the operational definitions, the
"inappropriate performance of an operation dependent upon information feedback
apart from that provided by a control" is considered a display error.
In the specific case of the S055A grating position indicator, provisions
were made to allow some latitude around the instructed value. A fine point
(i.e., +0005) tolerance around the desired value was established as a reasonable
band for positioning the grating. This limit w=s based on the fact that the
units digit of this display changed so rapidly that it was nearly impossible to
exactly position the grating without single stepping. Consequently, the tens
digit was very likely used for positioning the grating.
Limits or tolerances also had to be established for time sequences. For
example, if the Hcal camera was intended to be operated at 2 frames/min. for
3 minutes. How much time short of and beyond the two minute desired time
was considered acceptable? A basic guideline of +10% of the desired time was
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considered acceptable. Excursions outside this +10% band were classified as
time displacement errors.
The Raw Data Score Sheet (Figure 2-7) provided space for recording
reference information on each data point. Across the top of the sheet are spaces
for recording the number of the data point, Joint Observing Program (JOP)
Number, Building Block (BB) number, and mission time. This information was
available in the PAAS document, with the exception of the data point number
which was arbitrarily assigned by URS/Matrix analysts when the time periods
for analysis were initially selected from the PAAS.
The remainder of the score sheet was devoted to man/machine performance
scores for the various components monitored via telemetry for each ATM experi-
ment. The column at the far left of the score sheet included the designators
for the ATM experiments. The scientific name corresponding to each of the
designators is presented in Table 2-3.
Table 2-3: ATM Experiments Evaluated
Designator Code Scientific Name
Hal and 2 Hydrogen Alpha #1 and #2
S052 White Light Coronagraph
S054 X-Ray Spectrographic Telescope
S055A UV Scanning Polychromotor/Spectroheliometer
S056 X-Ray Telescope
S082A XUV Coronal Spectroheliograph
S082B UV Spectrograph
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The horizontal axis of the data score sheet included columns for control
components and display components. The abbreviations after the title of each
type of toggle switch refer to the characteristic of each switch position. These
abbreviations are: F, fixed; M, momentary; L, latching; SL, spring-loaded;
FG, fix-guarded. The display component types are listed in the adjoining
columns.
Space was provided at the right side of the data score sheet for classifying
the activity as either a sequential or a single operation. The next set of columns
afforded space for calssifying the error type. Errors of omission, inversion and
time displacement were mutually exclusive categories. The extreme right-hand
column provided space for remarks which were felt by the analyst to be relevant
to interpreting the score sheet entry.
The cells in the data score sheet provided space for recording number of
errors committed (as inferred from comparison of expected activity and telemetered
readouts) and error opportunities. The quotient of these two quantities is then
used as an error rate in subsequent calculations. In no case is it possible to have
an error committed without an error opportunity. That is, even though a haphazard
event may have been recorded from telemetry which cannot be reconciled with
procedural Instructions, it is not recorded as an error without an error opportunity.
In this case, an error opportunity was entered in the opportunity space to simplify
calculations which were to follow.
2.2.3 Inter-Rater Reliability
The data point scoring was performed by three analysts. Prior to the actual
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"analysis process, these individuals, together with two other senior analysts con-
ducted data scoring exercises with candidate operational definitions and candidate
scoring sheets. As several data points were scored, areas of conflict were discussed
and the operational definitions and score sheets were modified to alleviate problem
areas. This procedure also served as an opportunity to "walk through" the scoring
procedure for training purposes. Thus, inter-rater variability was reduced to a
minimal level. Prior to the major data point scoring effort, a single data point was
scored independently by each of the analysts. A comparison revealed no substantial
differences in error rates derived by the three analysts.
2.2.4 Statistical Analysis
2.2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
To report the results of the telemetry, data descriptive statistics were
prepared summarizing the distribution of error rates across the reference
:variables. Those descriptive statistics included three methods of analysis:
1) a cell to cell comparison of Table 3-1 data, 2) a look at parameter effects,
and 3) an in-depth analysis of factors contributing to unacceptable error rates.
Tables and discussions supportive to those analyses are provided in subsequent
sections of this report to describe and compare error rates by experiment,
,mission time, Building Block, etc.
2.2.4.2 Hypothesis Testing
As a result of a study of SL-2 telemetry data under an earlier contract phase
and the preliminary findings resulting from that study, several hypotheses were
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developed for testing in the SL-3/SL-4 analysis. These hypotheses are:
1. The use of three-position toggle switches produces a significantly higher
error rate than does the use of other types of toggle switches.
2. The use of rotary switches with positions numbering more than four
produces a significantly higher error rate than does the use of rotary
switches with four positions.
3. The use of rotary switches with positions numbering more than four
produces a significantly higher error rate than does the use of other types
of switches investigated.
4. Experiments operated on the left side of the C&D panel produce a signifi-
cantly higher error rate than do experiments operated on the right side.
5. Operating Hal produces a significantly higher error rate than does
operating any other experiment on the left side of the panel.
6. Performing "isolated actuations" produces a higher error rate than does
performing "sequential operations".
7. There is no significant difference in performance between operating
S082A and operating S082B.
8. Operating experiments with high C&D layout similarity (e.g., Hal, S052,
S082A, S082B) produces a higher error rate than does operating experiments
with dissimilar C&D arrangements (e.g., S056, S055A, S054).
9. Operating the lower half of the ATM panel produces a significantly higher
error rate than does operating the upper half of the panel.
10. SL-4 operations produce lower error rates than do SL-3 operations.
11. The first one-third of each mission's operations produce higher error
rates than do the remaining two-thirds of each mission's operations.
Two statistical methods were employed to test the hypotheses. These were
chi-square and a 2 x 2 analysis of variance for repeated measures. Results of the
statistical analysis appear in Section 3.1.2.
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2.3 CRITICAL INCIDENTS ANALYSIS
2.3.1 General Approach
Because the telemetry data analysis employed a sampling strategy, it was
felt that a review of all the available SL-3 and SL-4 voice transcripts could reveal
other periods of problems that might be of interest and could provide a different slant
on the operation of the ATM control/display panel. Consequently, these transcripts
were obtained and reviewed to identify relevant remarks.
2.3.2 Nature of the Data
In reviewing the voice transcripts for the SL-3 and SL-4 missions, it was
recognized that an information body very different from the telemetry data was
involved. The most outstanding difference was the subjective nature of the informa-
tion -- being composed of the actual statements and questions made by the flight
and ground crews during and after the ATM passes. Rather than having a record
of exactly what happened, the analysts had a partial record of what was perceived:.
That the voice transcripts contain only flight and ground crew perceptions is
obvious -- something must be perceived before a comment about it may be voiced.*
The "partial" characteristic of the data may be explained by four limitations:
1) It is not reasonable to assume that everything perceived was voiced aloud.
2) Not everything voiced aloud was recorded.
*The exception to this is mission time, which was coded on the tapes as comments
were recorded.
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3) Not every recorded verbal comment was translated to tape.
4) Not every taped comment was included in the edited transcriptions of
the tapes.
As URS/Matrix analysts worked from the MSFC/HOSC collection of edited voice
transcripts in culling for critical incidents, they had to develop a methodology which
would allow collection of as much information as possible related to the ATM man/
machine interface while, at the same time, accommodating the inherent limitations
of the data body.
2.3.3 Types of Information Available
Certain general information was available in the transcripts. Mission day
and time were coded as comments were made. Occasionally, the flight crew or
ground control referenced their comments to specific JOP, Building Block, Shopping
List, and/or experiment numbers. The comments ranged from very broad remarks
about whole panel layout and ATM pass scheduling to very specific comments or
questions about number of seconds exposure for a certain frame in a certain experi-
ment and problems encountered with a specific control or display. The analysts
were able to determine from the comments, with few exceptions, whether the remark
was of a positive or negative nature. Adding to these remarks the analysts' own
knowledge of panel hardware and experiment procedures, they were able to infer
a relative level of severity or benefit to overall ATM, specific experiment, or
specific hardware item function intimated by the remark.
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2.3.4 Organization and Reduction of Voice Transcript Derived Data
To organize all this information, a Critical Incidents Raw Data Score Sheet
(Figure 2-9) was generated. This form enabled the analysts to record as much
information as was available from the voice transcripts (not every blank was filled
in on every sheet). This information was further reduced by tallying and subsequent
across-hardware type, across-procedure, across-experiment, and across-mission
comparison, with the experiments rank ordered by frequency of remark occurrence.
The comparison by remark frequency was then complemented by a study of the
relative impact of a noted problem, regardless of the number of times it was mentioned.
This was done to allow for those instances in which a small number or single remark
may have revealed an important problem.
2.3.4.1 Data Breakdown
Before scoring the compiled critical incidents from SL-3 and SL04, the three
principal personnel assigned to Critical Incidents Analysis reviewed the total body
of data gathered. It was apparent that the incidents reported in the transcripts fell
generally into two large categories: 1) reports of errors on the part of the flight
crew or the ground, and 2) comments (not associated with an error) criticizing or
complementing various procedures, schedules, operations, or hardware.
As the remarks were reviewed, a more detailed picture of the two categories
emerged and was refined into the following sets of categories and subcategories:
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ERRORS
Errors were divided into four types:
* Commission error - Flight crew performed some operation that was
not supposed to be performed, or performed an operation inacurrately.
* Omission error - Flight crew failed to perform a directed operation.
* Inversion error - Flight crew performed two or more operations out
of sequence from the way they were scheduled.
* Time displacement error - Flight crew performed some operation
early or late, or ran out of time and could not complete an operation.
These were then subclassified, wherever the data indicated, as pertaining
to either hardware or procedures, as shown below.
Hardware
* Controls, by type
* Displays, by type
Procedures
* Scheduling or instructions -- as trained, contained on the cue
cards, pad, provided by way of special voiced instructions, etc.
* Operations - performing or failing to perform an operation pertain-
ing to the ATM panel.
* Time displacement - not performing an operation at the scheduled
time.
COMMENTS
These data were divided into the same hardware and procedural group-
ings used for subclassifying error categories, e.g.,
Hardware
* Controls
* Displays
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Procedures
* Scheduling/Instructions
* Operations
* Time Displacement.
The difference between "comments" and the incidents scored as errors was
that the critical remarks scored as "comments" were not immediately and obviously
associated with an error. They were mostly remarks about the hardware, schedules,
or procedures, i.e., comments about inadequacies in specific hardware parts, sugges-
tions for improving instructions, beneficial discoveries about hardware auxiliary
capabilities, questions about proper procedures, and requests for clearer instruc-
tions.
2.3.4.2 Basic Scoring Procedure
After review of all the Critical Incidents Raw Data Score Sheets, the three
analysts principally involved in reading the transcripts conferred to score each
reported incident into the appropriate categories and subcategories described in
Paragraph 2.3.4.1. Remarks were scored as,
* Error (+ type, i.e., commission (C), omission (0), inversion (I), time
displacement (TD))
* "Comment", a remark not associated with an error (recorded as a "positive
comment" (C+) or "negative comment" (C-)).
It must be realized that every scored critical incident evolved out of some remark
made by either the flight crew or the ground support team, but the term "comment"
in the context of critical incidents analysis scoring has a special meaning, as indi-
cated by the discussion of the term in Paragraph 2.3.4.1.
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The procedure for identifying, classifying and scoring critical incidents is
shown in Figure 2-10.
Some examples of incidents and scores are provided below to show more pre-
cisely how scoring criteria were applied.
Incident Scored as:
Example #1: Crewman began S052 Commission Error,
Day 231-16-01-02 Building Block before Time discrepancy
ESR by mistake. (C, TD).
Example #2: Ground informed crew Omission Error,
Day 232-10-45-05 that the Voltage Detector Operations
had been left in ENABLE (O, 0)
overnight.
Example #3: Crew remarked that Negative Comment,
Day 226-28-06-20 S055 Detector 5 kept HV Detectors
kicking off during MARs, (C-, Detectors)
so they turned it off.
Basically, these scores were entered into master tables for SL-3 and SL-4 across
from the experiment they pertained to and under the hardware or procedure type
identified in the remark. Errors and "comments" were tallied separately, so discus-
sion could take place with regard to: 1) noted (or inferred) error frequency, and
2) non-error associated remark frequency. Total incidents (including both noted
errors and non-error remarks) were also computed and studied.
In addition to the data scored on the master score sheets for SL-3 and SL-4,
a running log was maintained for the purpose of recording single event critical
incidents. That is, all voice transcript comments that were, by themselves, con-
sidered to be important were noted and saved for future discussion.
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Identify Critical Incident
in Voice Transcript
Note Mission Time (Approx. *)
Identify Experiment Number
or General Subject
Classify Remarks as:
or or
ERROR COMMENT
* Commission
* Omission e Positive
* Inversion
* Time Displacement e Negative
Assign Subcategories
or or
Hardware Proc ed u re
Type: Type:
* Switches e Scheduling/
* Counters Instructions
* Monitors * Experiment Operations
* etc. * Operational Time
Phasing
*Voice transcripts revealed what time the remark was made and, therefore, the
analysts had only an approximate indication of what time the incident actually
occurred.
Figure 2-10: Flow Diagram of Critical Incidents Scoring Procedure (Shows major
classifications and subclassifications of critical incidents used in data breakdown
and scoring.)
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The master tables for SL-3 and SL-4 Critical Incidents Analysis and results
of the analysis are presented in Section 3.2.
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SECTION 3.0
DATA ANALYSES, RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
This section addresses the analyses, results and conclusions of separate
studies of two bodies of data. Fundamental to many parts of the discussions
presented here are detailed descriptions of the analysis procedures and the ways
they were used to extract the results and conclusions reported. Therefore,
Section 3.1 contains discussions of procedures used, results obtained and con-
clusions drawn during the descriptive statistical analysis and during the formal
testing of hypotheses relating to the telemetry data. Section 3.2 contains dis-
cussions of procedures, results and conclusions associated with the analysis of
the voice transcript data.
3.1 TELEMETRY DATA
Before the raw telemetry data could be subjected to statistical analysis, it
was necessary to tally the rows and columns of all of the individual data point
score sheets, an example of which is shown in Figure 3-1. This was done using
time as an index, the data were pooled within each one-third of each of the two
Skylab missions studied. Thus, three Data Summary Sheets (see Appendix B,
Figure B-la - B-1F) were prepared for each mission. The summary totals for each one-
third mission period were, in turn, added with the other two one-third summaries
for the same mission to provide a Whole-Mission Data Summary Sheet (Appendix B,
Figure B-2a - B-2b) . Then, all four data summary sheets for each mission were used
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RAW DATA SCORE SHEET
DATA POINT #: 35- JOP #: BB #: _ MISSION TIME: 
o /(- '3-
CONTROLS DISPLAYS Z/CREW OPN ZERROR TYPE
KEY:
ERRORS COMMITTED
ERROR OPPORTUNITIES
Figure 3-1: Example of Raw Data Score Sheet for Telemetry Data AnalysisFigure 3-1: Example of Raw Data Score Sheet for Telemetry Data Analysis
Table 3-1: Error Rate Comparison Table
COLUMN A B C D E F G H I
X/3 OF MISSION 1/3 2/3 3/3 1/3 2/3 3/3. TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
MISSION SL-3 SL-3 SL-3 SL-4 SL-4 SL-4 SL-3 SL-4 SL-3&SL-4
ROW
NUMBER ROW TITLE
[.012][.015] [.012] [.027]
1 CONTROLS TOTAL .041 0 .026 .007 .024 .034 .042 .021 .032
2 H01 .000 [
0 3 5056 .033 .032 .027 .009 .045 - .032 
.013 .022
4 SO082A .000 .030 .000 .000 .000 .024 .011 .011 .011
Z 5 S082B D .000 .000 .038 .000 .011 .029
0 6 5052 .000 .023 .000 ( .034 .039
7 S055A .046 .012 .010 .010 .000 .014 .024 .010 .018
8 5054 .028 000 .000 .000 .013 .039 .005 .027
9 DISPLAYS TOTAL 7 9 21 .023 0 1
10 Hal
> 11 S056 .000 .000 .000 .000
12 SO082A .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 G .000 
.023
L 13 S082B .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .045 .031
14 S052 .000 .000 .000 .000 07
15 SO055A 000 90
16 S054
[.019][.017] [.018] [.033]
17 CONTROLS & DISPLAYS TOTAL 55Q0 .030 .018 .029 .033 .049 .026 .038
(n 18 Hal 0 C .0000 D
o 19 5056 .033 .032 .027 .009 .042 .000 
.032 .013 .022
Ix 20 5082A .020 .023 .000 .000 .000 .018 .018 .009 .013
21 082 .049 .000 .000 .000 .046 .017 .030z 0828
0 22 S052 .000 .021 .000 0 .039 .042
U D 23 5055A .026 .021 .033 .014 .012 .042 .021 .033
24 S054 .028 0 .000 .000 .000 .013 .039 .005 .027
25 TOGGLE, 2 POS, F-F .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
W 26 TOGGLE, 3 POS, F-F-M .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
27 TOGGLE, 3 POS, F-F-F Q Q .026 .003 .040 032 .046
28 TOGGLE, 3 POS, M-SL-M .026 .029 .011 .000 .017 .018 .024 .012 .018
29 ROTARY, 4 POS .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .021 .008
30 ROTARY, 5 POS .000 .000 .000 057 .043 .048
Z 31 ROTARY, 6 POS .000 .000 .000 .000 .12 .000
0 32 ROTARY, 8 POS .036 .000 .040 .000 .000 .025 .030 .027
V 33 ROTARY, 11 POS .021 .032 .000 .000 .000 .022 .012 .017
S34 ELECTROMAGNETIC COUNTERS .275 .08 .033 .025 .13 097
35 ILLUMINATED STATUS IND. .25 13 1 000 .000 .16 .000 12
Z 36 SEQUENTIAL OPERATIONS .046 .05 .025 .010 .026 .033 .044 .022 .034
0 37 SINGLE OPERATIONS 11 1070
38 PROCEDURAL DEVIATIONS .032 .017 .009 .007 .005 .030 .022 .016 .019
[ ] = Revised Rates
0 = Unacceptable Error Rates
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to provide the error and error opportunity data necessary to calculate (by dividing
error opportunities into errors, ) the error rates that appear in each cellEO
of the Error Rate Comparison Table (Table 3-1). As this table was the point of
departure for all of the statistical analyses, and as it is extensively referenced
throughout this report, a detailed description of i't is presented here.
Upon examination, it is apparent that the comparison table (Table 3-1 above)
is made up of nine columns of 38 rows (342 individual cells). Each row has been
assigned a number from 1 to 38 and each column has been given a letter from
A to I. Arrangement of the rows and columns within the table is intended to
facilitate visual as well as mathematical analysis. For example, columns A, B
and C contain the error rate data for all the measurement parameters from the
first, second and third one-thirds of SL-3, respectively. In the same manner,
columns D, E and F contain the error rate data for SL-4. Columns G and H
contain the overall error rates for SL-3 and SL-4, respectively. It is, therefore,
a relatively easy matter to compare the data from the first mission across time
with data from the second mission. It is also easy to compare error rate levels
for each parameter from mission to mission by simply referring to columns G
and H.
Each row contains the error rate data relevant to.the measurement para-
meter indicated at its extreme right hand side. Of the 38 rows, 37 are used to
describe the same population of data in four distinctly different ways:
1) Rows 1 - 16 -- Controls and Displays, separately
2) Rows 17 - 24 -- Controls and Displays, combined
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3) Rows 25 - 35 -- Hardware Type
4) Rows 36 - 37 -- Sequential vs Single Operations
Specifically, rows 1 through 8 include error rate data on the controls for each
of the ATM experiments. Rows 9 through 16 contain complementary display data
for the same experiments. Rows 17 through 24 contain error rates calculated
from exactly that same body of data, but grouped into control and display
errors combined for each ATM experiment. Rows 25 through 35 contain a third
set of error rates calculated for the original data population. These error rates
are for each specific kind of ATM panel control or display component investigated.
Rows 25 through 33 contain error rates for controls and rows 34 and 35 contain
those for displays. One last error rate set describing the data population is grouped
in rows 36 and 37. Here, all ATM C&D activity is transposed into error rates accord-
ing to its membership in one of two classes: single or sequential operations.
Row 38 was added to the table for comparison purposes only. It contains
"normalized" procedural deviation data that are unrelated to the ATM control and
display hardware. Its method of computation and functional application is fully
described later in the text.
3.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
A variety of related descriptive analysis techniques were employed in an
effort to describe between -- and within -- Skylab ATM experiment performance
relationships. These were: 1) a direct, item by item comparison of Table 3-1
cell data, 2) a search for ordering effects, and 3) an identification of all Table 3-1
cells with error rate values of .05 or greater.
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3.1.1. Error Rate Cell Comparison
Overall Mission Performance - Comparison of overall mission performance on
SL-3 and SL-4 (cells 17G and 17H of Table 3-1), reveals that the SL-4 error rate was
approximately half (.53) that of SL-3. Both the controls and the displays contributed
to this difference (refer to cells 1G, 1H, 9G and 9H of Table 3-1) . While dramatic,
this difference is nevertheless, in the direction expected, a fact attributable to the
learning that took place on the part of the SL-4 crew and ground support personnel
as a result of the previous mission experiences, longer available training time and
improved procedures directives. However, when the error rates for both missions
are plotted by thirds of mission (Figure 3-1), some unexpected differences appear
in the profiles. The SL-3 error rates diminished as the mission progressed. This
improvement in performance was expected, and could be explained as being due to
the effect of learning and environmental adaptation, but, if learning and adaptation
phenomena are used to explain the error rate in SL-3, how can the increases that
occurred across SL-4 be explained? For the answer to that question, it is necessary
to return to the data. First, referring to Table 3-1, it appears that cells 18E, 18F,
21E and 22F account for the increased error rates for the second and third one-thirds
of SL-4. Checking further reveals that the high error rates registered in cells 18E
and 18F were due entirely to high Hal experiment control error rates (cells 2E and
2F in Table 3-1). Therefore, an in-depth search of the raw data score sheets was
made to identify the reasons for the high cell 2E and 2F error rates. (Note: cells
21E and 22F were excluded from investigation at this point because of their relatively
lower error rates and their disjointed relationship to each other.) As a result of the
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in-depth data search, it was discovered that, during both the second and third one-
thirds of SL-4, there were uninterrupted periods of time when the crew's selection
of an Hal frames per minute rate was always in error. For the second one-third of
that mission, the error period spanned data points 253 to 256 and accounted for all
four (4) Hal errors registered. For the third one-third of the mission, the period
covered data points 293 through 309 and accounted for all thirteen (13) Hal errors.
If the Hal errors registered during the two periods of time investigated had
been due to some panel design deficiency, they would be expected to have been
scattered more or less randomly through the data. That they were not is indicative
of some study data source deficiency -- that is to say, it is likely that the SL-4 crew
was either instructed to take Hal pictures at a rate other than the one indicated in
the Building Blocks or that they decided on their own to take pictures at a different
rate. In either case, there is little justification for scoring these events as errors
during those two periods. Thus, the error rates for Table 3-1 cells IE, IF, 1H,
2E, 2F, 17E, 17F, 17H, 18E and 18F were recalculated. All of the Hal error rate
cells (Table 3-1 cells 2E, 2F, 18E, 18F) changed to a value of zero. More importantly,
cells 17E and 17F (Table 3-1), reflecting overall ATM experiment error rates for
the second and third one-thirds of SL-4, were changed to .019 and .017, respectively.
This implies that there were no practical differences in error rates between the first,
second and third one-thirds of SL-4, so there appeared to be no learning or adapta-
tion effects experienced by the SL-4 crew. This finding, together with the low over-
all error rates experienced on SL-4 suggests that prelaunch training for SL-4 was
more effective and more complete than was that for SL-3 (irrespective of differences
3-8
in levels of task difficulty and complexity). Before such a statement could be made,
however, it was necessary to check the SL-3 data to ensure that no hidden study
discrepancies had accounted for the SL-4 error rate profile. When that check was
made, it was found that the SL-3 errors were distributed with appropriate homo-
geneity throughout the mission. Therefore, it appears likely that most of the errors
scored for SL-3 were due more to the crew-ATM system interaction effects than to
any study artifact. Thus, on the basis of the adjusted overall mission error rate
profiles (Figure 3-2, above), some combination of the following may apply:
* SL-4 crew training was more effective and complete than that received by
the crew of SL-3.
* SL-3 tasks were more difficult than SL-4 tasks.
* SL-4 crew environmental adaptation occurred prior to their commence-
ment of ATM experiment operations.
* SL-4 ATM experiment work tasks increased in difficulty at a rate which
offset any increase in crew proficiency.
Individual Display Performance - While the overall error rate profiles of the
two crews differed, both crews were similar in that they greatly reduced their"
across-time error rates while using displays (Figure 3-3, above) . In spite of this,
neither crew was able to perform any better than 1/3 to 1/5 as well on displays than they
did on controls (Table 3-1, cells 9G, 9H, IG and 1H). In looking for explanations
for those statistics, it was necessary to look directly at the display population charac-
teristics. First, the number of display types contributing data to this study was
small -- only three. These included timing devices, experiment ready-operate
lights, and the S055A grating position indicator. Second, these displays served
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only two functions -- timing and positioning.
Timing was accomplished both through the use of timers and by checking the
status of ready-operate lights. Many of the operations that involved the use of
timers (i.e., displays) were terminated automatically. These were part of a sequen-
tial operation, which, judging from the sequential' operation error rate data (Table 3-1,
cells 3A through F), contributed little to the displays problem. Indeed, when the
individual data points are examined, this is borne out. The remaining operations
involving the use of timing devices and ready-operate lights were manually initiated
single operations. A check of the single operation error rate cells (Table 3-1,
cells 37A through F) indicates this is where the problem lies. That manually timed
operations) were often poorly performed is not surprising, since the displays used
on this panel were designed to be of low target value.
Incorrect setting of the S055A grating position involved a totally different
problem. That operation was always performed sequentially, and, furthermore,
the display was generally closely monitored to ensure its accurate setting. Never-
theless, many grating setting errors occurred. After checking the individual
data point score sheets, no doubt remains that some few of the positioning errors
resulted from incorrectly interpreting directive information. Most of the errors
of this kind, however, were due to the dynamics of the display itself. These
occurred in the following way: The directive information specified a grating setting
on a particular line. Yet, when the S055A mode switch was set in REFERENCE and
the start/stop switch was activated, the last digit on the grating position indicator
changed so rapidly that its value was impossible to read. Thus, the operator was
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forced to use the tens digit together with an anticipatory response in order to approxi-
mate the correct setting. Anticipatory response inaccuracies often presented the
operator with two distasteful choices. First, if he undershot the mark, he was faced
with placing the mode select switch in GRATING, SINGLE and advancing the display
number one count at a time with the start/stop switch. Because of this cumbersome
procedure, it is likely that the crew tried, instead, to go as close to the mark as
possible while in the REFERENCE position. Unfortunately, trying for the close shot
often led to an overshoot predicament. In that instance, the operator could decide
he was close enough or elect to go back through the whole grating select procedure
(incurring a 5 min. delay). Thus, these overshoots, coupled with operator reluc-
tance to repeat a cumbersome and time consuming procedure to arrive at a correct
grating setting, led to most of the grating position errors.
Overall Display Performance - Having addressed the finding of overly poor
display performance, it is now appropriate to return to the discussion of display
error rate profiles. As previously stated, display error rates do decrease across
time in both missions. In fact, the decrease in both cases is sufficiently consistent
and dramatic to raise some question about the extent to which ground training (i.e.,
their previous learning as applied to crew ability to use the displays provided)
prepared them for inflight display operations. However, the general inability of
these displays to serve their intended function is the overriding factor. Since that
has already been discussed, the issue will not be pursued further here.
Additional Hardware Problem Areas - In addition to the problem areas already
discussed, there are three other points associated with the Error Rate Comparison
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Table (Table 3-1) that must be covered. One is the obvious discrepancy between
the SL-3 and SL-4 illuminated status indicators error rates (Table 3-1, cells 35G
and 35H) . Such a discrepancy is sufficient cause to look for some contributing
factor. In this case, the factor seems to be the data themselves. Specifically, it
is the number of times that an illuminated status indicator was used during the SL-4
Mission, e.g., a use frequency of 13 simply does not justify placing great confidence
in the error rate calculated.
The second point to be covered relates to six-position rotary switches. Those
switches were also associated with a dramatic shift in error rates from SL-3 to SL-4
(Table 3-1, cells 31G and 31H). Unlike the case of illuminated status indicators,
however, these controls were employed a sufficient number of times during both
missions to justify some confidence in the error rates calculated. Unfortunately, a
close second look at the individual data point score sheets did not uncover any reason
for this shift, so it must be written off as an error shift attributable to differences
in crew training effectiveness, deliberate operator deviation from directed procedure,
unrecorded changes of instructions, or isolated accidental errors.
Procedural Deviations - Procedural deviations is the third point associated
with the Error Rate Comparison Table that must be discussed. While included in
the table, in truth, these data are more "normalized" than they are error rate quanti-
ties. That is, while the error rate data represent the quotient of errors over error
opportunities, procedural deviation rates were calculated by dividing the total
number of procedural deviations by the total number of control plus display error
opportunities ( Total Proc. Dev. . Procedural deviations could not be classified asTotal C&D EO
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errors, nor could they enter into determination of the number of error opportunities.
Therefore, at first glance, it would not seem appropriate to divide one by the other.
Yet error opportunities are the best available measure of ATM experiment work
density, so dividing error opportunities into the number of procedural deviations
should normalize the data and provide some insight into a procedural deviation
"rate".
Now that the procedural deviation number and its method of calculation have
been explained, some effort will be made to define the term "procedural deviation".
A procedural deviation is any ATM experiment C&D activity involving two or more
operations that is performed in place of, or in addition to, the activity required by
official directive. In other words, a procedural deviation is activity not called for
in the study reference documents, but which was almost certainly done on purpose.
Recognizing this, it should be clear that there are at least three reasons for the
occurrence of procedural deviations:
1) The operator deliberately added or substituted the activity.
2) Some unidentified source directed the operator.
3) The operator misunderstood his operating instructions.
If the first or second reasons are the predominant causes for procedural
deviations, it seems plausable to expect the deviation density value to vary somewhat
independently of the overall controls plus displays error rate for the same operating
period. Conversely, if the procedural deviations occur primarily as a result of
misunderstood instructions (procedural errors) it seems plausable to assume that
the deviation density number would correlate positively (at least loosely) with the
overall controls plus displays error rates for the same operating period. With this
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rationale having been explained, it is now appropriate to turn to Table 3-1 to
examine the actual procedural deviation density rates. When comparing the rates
in cells 38A through C with those in cells 17A through C, a loose similarity of
pattern becomes apparent. Thus, to the degree that the assumptions just advanced
are sound, the procedural deviations recorded during SL-3 are due to misunder-
stood or misinterpreted instructions. In other words, they are procedural errors.
When comparing the procedural deviation density rates with the controls and displays
error rates for SL-4 (see cells 38D through F and cells 17D through F in Table 3-1),
a slightly different pattern emerges. At the outset and through the second one-third
of SL-4, both rates remain more or less constant. Then, in the third part of the
mission, the procedural density rate soars upward while the controls and displays
error rate number remains at its former level. Again, to the degree that the assump-
tions germane to this analysis are correct, the procedural deviations that occurred
in the first two thirds of SL-4 are procedural errors. Those deviations occurring
in the last third of SL-4, however, are deliberate procedural deviations. Thus,
for all SL-3 and SL-4 time periods, save the last one-third of SL-4, there is statis-
tical evidence that procedural errors did occur. Such evidence, in turn, suggests
that there were some incidents of procedural directive functional breakdown.
3.1.1.2 Ordering Effects
After addressing the Error Rate Comparison Table (Table 3-1) cell-to-cell
relationships, the table data (revised) were given a second look to check for mission-
to mission ordering effects.* After rank ordering all the parameter error rates, only
*Revised figures are noted in brackets. I in Table 3-1.
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one such effect could be found, and that one had to do with toggle switches. Even in
that case, only two members (3-position, F-F-F, and 3-position, M-SL-M) were in-
volved. Considering the components and the kinds of errors involved, it is likely
that the ordering effect observed was due as much to component function as to any
particular physical component attributes.
3.1.1.3 Unacceptable Error Rates
For the analytical purposes of this study, any error rate equal to or greater
than .05 was considered unacceptable. Once identified, these error rates (the
circled quantities in Table 3-1) were used in a subtractive process to "drive out"
their causative factors. Hal serves as a straightforward example of the process.
Row 18 of Table 3-1 shows that 8 of the 9 cells contain unacceptable error
rates. A quick look at rows 2 and 10 revealed (by the relative absense or presence
of unacceptable error rates) that the problem is control related. Therefore, the
Hal controls row of each Data Point Score Sheet (Figure 3-1, above) was consulted.
In so doing, it was determined that all of the Hal errors identified occurred in
selecting the frames per minute picture rate, an operation that involves the setting
of a three-position, F-F-F, toggle switch. This knowledge enabled a factoring
out of both the error and the error opportunity numbers from the appropriate
half-cells under the Hal controls (alone), under the Hal controls and displays
(combined) and under the three-position toggle switch (F-F-F) headings. Then, the
error rate for each cell impacted was recalculated. If the recalculated rate fell
below .05, then the factor removed was credited as the one responsible for the
unacceptable error rate. During the course of this analysis, if there had been an
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instance where the removal of no single factor would drive the error rate below
.05, then as many contributing factors as possible would have been identified. That
done, the fewest number of those factors that, extracted together, would have dropped
the error rate to below .05 would have been credited with the unacceptable error
rate. Fortunately, in this study, every unacceptable error rate cell could be
accounted for by removing just one factor. Those factors together with a compendium
of the Table 3-1 cells whose error rates they drove above .05 and presented in
Table 3-2.
Table 3-2: Factor Classification for
Error Rates (Cell Values) Exceeding 5%
I. TIME DISPLACEMENT FACTOR
5B, 5G, 6A, 6C, 6F, 6G, 8B, 9B, 9C, 9E, 12A, 12G, 13E, 14F, 14H, 141, 15B,
15C, 15E, 21B, 21E, 22A, 22C, 22F, 22G, 24B, 34B, 34E, 35A, 35B, 35C, 35G,
351, 37A, 37B, 37C, 37D, 37E, 37G, 37H and 371. N = 41
2. S055A GRATING POSITION FACTOR
9A, 9D, 9G, 9H, 91, 15A, 15D, 15G, 15H, 151, 23A, 34A, 34D, 34G, 341-I and
341. N = 16
3. Hal FRAMES PER MIN. FACTOR (Revised Figures)
1B, 2A, 2B, 2C, 2G, 21, 17A, 17B, 18A, 18B, 18C, 18G, 181, 27B, 27F, 27G, and
36B. N = 17
4. MODE SELECT FACTOR
o 5-position rotary sw: 30C, 30D, 30F and 30G N = 4
o 6-position rotary sw: 31A, 31B, 31G and 311 N = 4
o 3-position toggle sw (F-F-F): 5A N = 1
o 4-position rotary sw: 29F N = 1
o 8-position rotary sw: 32D N = 1
o 11-position rotary sw: 33E N = 1
TOTAL N =12
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Table 3-2: Factor Classification for
Error Rates (Cell Values) Exceeding 5%
(Continued)
5. DATA POINT #6 FACTOR
27A N =
The error rates above .05 in 85 of the Table 3-1 cells can be attributed to
the presence of the five factors ranked by cell impact in Table 3-2. Indeed, the
unacceptable error rates in 84 of those cells can be attributed to the first four factors.
The fifth factor accounts for the unacceptable rate in the remaining cell. But, being
the performance on an isolated task in the early period of SL-3, that factor is not
representative of any recurring problem and will not receive further discussion.
3.1.1.3.1 Time Displacement Errors
Time displacement errors by far accounted for the largest number of error
rate cells -- 41 in all, or 47.1% of the 87 total. In addressing this problem, at
least four contributors (excluding hardware malfunctions and isolated accidental
errors) should be recognized. They are:
1) Deliberate deviations
2) Directive functional breakdown
3) Procedural problems
4) Display functional breakdown
1) Deliberate deviations - In many complex tasks where the operator has
decision making authority, deliberate deviations from established procedure are
likely to occur. While these deviations are not real errors, when they involved
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only one operation, they were scored as errors during this analysis. Therefore,
they certainly had some impact on the overall error picture. Unfortunately, the
telemetry data do not provide sufficient resolution to allow assessment of problem
magnitude.
2) Directive functional breakdown - This category includes such error
sources as misread checklists or misunderstood voice communications. And, while
no specific examples have been extracted from the telemetry data analysis to support
the argument that this category contributes to time displacement errors, for both
SL-3 and SL-4 there are telemetry data that establish its role in related kinds of
errors (e.g., inversion of order, numerical digit transposition and Hal frames/min).
Add to this prima facie evidence the cluttered Building Block format and some voice
transcript comments, and indeed, there is a good face validity argument for infor-
mation breakdown's contribution to time displacement errors.
One of the likely problems in this area is the way operational directives are
presented. In the Building Blocks, for example, manual termination is signified
by the use of a dashed line in place of the normal solid one. Because of the physical
characteristics of both lines, the distinction can be easily missed by a "pushed"
crewman. Another Building Block problem is the method used to identify activity
initiation times (i.e., by checking the alignment of noncontinuous lines with hash
marks across the top and bottom of a page) . Still another source of Building Block
information breakdown that contributes to time displacement errors is the lack of
prominence given to experiment run time.
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The impact of voice communications and other directive sources on time
displacement errors could not be investigated using the telemetry data base. Insights
pertaining to this area must be derived from the Critical Incidents Analysis, Section
3.2.
3) Procedural problems - Procedural problems that lead to deviations from
expected timelines can be caused by factors such as inappropriate mission scheduling,
extreme work density, incompatible work task arrangement and equipment malfunc-
tions. In fact, the telemetry data together with the voice transcripts provided
evidence that all of those factors played some role in contributing to the time dis-
placement problem. The telemetry data alone, however, are of little utility in deter-
mining the exact role of each factor. Therefore, discussion of these factors must
also be seated in the Critical Incidents Analysis.
4) Display functional breakdown - This is one area on which the telemetry
data provide an abundance of information. For example, the data show repeated
instances where S055A was not manually terminated in conjunction with the auto-
matic termination of other experiments as required. Yet when this action is required,
the related Building Block directives are among the clearest of all directives presented.
Thus, when manual experiment termination is keyed to the automatic termination of
another experiment, it appears that the blame for any time displacement errors can
be laid at the feet of the displays involved. For an in-depth description of the
particular problems associated with the use of those displays, refer to Section 3.1 .1.1.
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3.1.1.3.2 Setting the S055A Grating Position Incorrectly
The incorrect setting of the S055A grating position placed second in impact
behind time displacement errors. At least three factors contributed to the incorrect
setting of that grating. They were: deliberate deviations, directive functional
breakdown, and display to user functional breakdown. Deliberate deviations pose
no problems and will not be discussed further. Directive functional breakdowns, on
the other hand, were a problem. In at least one instance where the Building Block
operating procedures called for the selection of six different grating positions in
order, the order of actual performance was incorrect, and one of the ordered grating
positions was omitted.
Display functions breakdowns for the S055A grating position indicator have
already been fully treated in Section 3.1.1 and will not be treated further.
3.1.1.3.3 Hal Frames Per Minute Errors
Errors in selecting the proper number of frames per minute for Hcal was the
third greatest contributor to the number of cells containing error rate figures above
.05. Because the .000 error rate (revised) incurred while operating this frame rate
control during SL-4, it is not likely that the control characteristics themselves were
responsible for the high SL-3 rates. It is more likely that some combination of
deliberate deviations and directive functional breakdown produced the rates above
the .05 level. Here again, deliberate deviation are of no concern. Directive to user
information transmission breakdowns, on the other hand, are of concern. And, for
Hal, any information transmisssion breakdown most assuredly was the result of
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the position relegated to frame rate information in the Building Block format.
3.1.1.3.4 Mode Selection Errors
The remaining cells containing error rate above .05 can be accounted for by:
a mode select control factor. Most probably that factor also contains such contributors
as intentional deviations and directive functional breakdown. However, it seems
apparent from looking at the hardware variations making up the populations of mode
select, controls (Table 3-2, above) that control function seemed to play a greater role
in error rate than did control type.
3.1.2 Formal Statistical Analysis, Testing Eleven ATM C&D-Related Hypotheses
Up to this point, information about the analysis of SL-3 and SL-4 telemetry
data has focused on the signostic or analytic approach taken in studying the various
components and characteristics of the control panel. Error data so obtained and the
consequent effects of those errors on mission performance served as the criteria for
focusing study to specific panel elements on operations. Following that portion of
telemetry data analysis, and using data derived from it, a formal analysis which
tested eleven hypotheses was conducted. This section (3. 1.2) comprises a report
of that formal analysis.
3.1.2.1 Hypothesis Development
Based on experience in designing, testing, and using the panel; analysis of
SL-2 data; and general human engineering design principles, URS/Matrix developed
a list of 25 hypotheses of interest. The data requirements for testing each hypothesis
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were compared with the data telemetered during SL-3 and SL-4 relevant to the ATM
controls and displays. Hypotheses were then categorized in terms of their being
directly testable, indirectly testable, or not testable. The directly and indirectly
testable hypotheses were discussed with NASA technical representatives.
Table 3-3 contains the hypotheses determined to be of interest and testable,
given the data available from SL-3 and SL-4.
Table 3-3: ATM Assessment Hypotheses
HARDWARE RELATED
1. The use of three-position toggle switches produces a significantly higher error
rate than does the use of other types of toggle switches.
2. The use of rotary switches with positions numbering more than four produces
a significantly higher error rate than does the use of rotary switches 
with
four positions.
3. The use of rotary switches with positions numbering more than four produces
a significantly higher error rate than does the use of other types of 
switches
used on the ATM panel.
LAYOUT AND FUNCTIONAL ARRANGEMENT
4. Experiments operated on the left side of the C&D panel produce a significantly
higher error rate than do experiments operated on the right side.
5. Operating Hal produces a significantly higher error rate than does operating
any other experiment on the left side of the panel.
6. Isolated actuations produce a higher error rate than do sequential operations.
7. There is no significant difference in performance between operating S082A
and operating S082B.
8. Operating experiments with high C&D layout similarity (e.g., Hca2, S052,
S082A, S082B) produces higher error rates than does operating experiments
with dissimilar C&D arrangements (e.g., S056, S055A, S054).
3-22
Table 3-3: ATM Assessment Hypotheses
(continued)
9. Operating the lower half of the ATM Panel produces a significantly higher
operational error rate than does operating the upper half of the panel.
TIMELINE AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES HYPOTHESES
10. SL-4 operations produce lower error rates than do SL-3 operations.
11. The first 1/3 of each mission's operations produces higher error rates than do
the remaining 2/3 of each mission.
3.1.2.2 Hypothesis Testing and Results
For each hypothesis, appropriate statistical tests were identified and run. To
meet the constraints (e.g., repeated measures or correlated samples, non-normal
distribution, missing data) imposed by the data, both chi-square and analysis of
variance statistical tests were employed (Table 3-4). Table 3-5 presents the number
of errors vs error-free operations plus error rate for each hypothesis.
3.1.2.2.1 Hardware Related Hypotheses
None of the hypotheses dealing with controls were accepted. The variation in
errors appeared to be less a function of the specific type of control device than of
the procedural and functional envelopes surrounding the control. Certain switches,
e.g., five-position rotary, three-position toggle (F-F-F) have relatively high error
rates (.048 for the former, and .046 for the latter), but these rates were not reflected
consistently in other similar switches. This, combined with the observation that
high errors for any given control did not occur consistently across time periods for
either mission, reinforces two principles of C&D design.
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1) The adequacy of a given switch in a complex control panel is only partially
dependent on the design of the switch. The relation of the switch to other
control elements, layout, sequence, functional procedures, workload, or
the general operating envelope around the switch appears to be equally
important.
2) Evaluation of control hardware to be used in complex panels or operations
must be performed within the full operating envelope, where the inter-
actions noted above can occur.
While not a formal hypothesis, a question of considerable interest is the
performance of operations involving the use of controls versus those involving the
use of displays. The errors and error opportunities were summed across missions
for controls and displays and tested. The resulting chi-square of 38.72 (1 df) is
significant well beyond the .001 level. Display operations, with an error rate of
.10 relative to the .032 rate for controls operations, clearly contributed heavily to
the ATM panel error rate.
3.1.2.2.2 Layout and Procedural Related Hvootheses
Five experiments, Ha, S056, S082A, S082B, and S052, were on the left
side of the ATM Panel, two experiments, S055A and S054, were on the right.
As expected, the experiments comprising the left side had significantly (.01)
higher error rates than the experiments on the right side.
As noted in an earlier section of this report and confirmed in Hypothesis '5,
Ha contributes heavily to this result. Fifty-six percent of the error for the five
experiments on the left side of the panel occur while operating Ha. When Ha
data are removed, the left side error rate is .0279, and the right side is .020.
Chi-square shows no significance for this difference.
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Thus, left-right location appears to be a relatively minor contributor to
error rate. The significant difference is attributable to one deviant experiment
rather than left-right location per se.
For Hypothesis #5, the Ha error rate (.1295) was compared with the error
rate for all other experiments combined (.0296). The chi-square of 80.51 was
highly significant (p( .001) and clearly demonstrated the contribution of this
experiment to mission error. This finding must be kept in mind when looking
at all other testing using data comrnpiled by experiments, since Ha data tends to skew
such distributions.
Sequential operations exhi ited a significantly (p (.001) lower error rate
than isolated or single operations. The design implication of this result is that
establishing a chain of control activities even if they are only marginally related,
should help minimize error. Accomplishing this necessitates extensive attention
to the procedural/instructio ial aspects of the control panel system design.
Hypothesis #7 was ccepted; there were no differences in error between S082A
and B. These two expe iments had the highest degree of similarity, in terms of
location, layout, and ?rocedures, and this was expected to contribute to errors of
interpolation and location displacement. The errors which did occur did not bear
out this expectation considering only S082A and B.
When al l experiments were categorized on a similarity/dissimilarity dimension
(Hypothesis #8), a significant error difference appeared. This finding must be
viewed cautiously because of judgmental assignment to the category and because of
the ske /ing affects of Hal already discussed. The experiments included in high
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similarity were: Hal, S052, S082A, and S082B, and in low similarity: S056, S055A
and S054.
In spite of this, the result provides support based on operational data that
conspicuity and discernability must be considered in the design of controls and
displays. As other hypotheses have implied, so this one also points to the import-
ance of considering individual C&D and functional sub-units of a panel within their
total operating envelope in design.
The final hypothesis in this group tested the exeriments in the upper half
of the panel, Hal, S056, S082A and S055A, and lower half of the panel, S082B, S052
and 5054. There was not a significant difference.
3.1.2.2.3 Timeline and Operational Procedures Hypotheses
The differences between SL-3 and SL-4 were tested in several ways. Hypoth-
esis #10 was tested using x 2 which showed the SL-3 error rate significantly (pt .001)
greater than the SL-4 error rate. Hypothesis #11 was not accepted; the x 2 between
the first 1/3 and remaining 2/3 of each mission did not provide an adequate test of
the data.
Therefore, a 2x2 analysis of variance for repeated measures (Ref. Appendix A,
Weiner, 1962) was used to test missions and time periods. The test was run using
both transformed (x + .5, Ref. Appendix A, Edwards, 1962) and raw data. Mean error
rates were calculated for each control and display category. This was done to alleviate
the skewing effect of Ha when the data were summarized by experiment. Table 3-6
gives the results of the test.
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Table 3-4: Summary of Results for Hardware, Layout,
and Timeline Hypotheses for SL-3 and SL-4
Hypothesis Statistic Result df P Less Than
1.------ Chi-square 1.573 1 .22 N.S.
(x 2)
2.------ x 2.01 1 .15 N.S.
3.------ 2 .60 1 .80 N.S.
4.------ x 2  8.95 1 .01 *
5.------ x2 80.51 1 .001 *
6.------ x 2 33.57 1 .001 *
7.------ x2 .687 1 .45 N.S.
8.------ x2 20.47 1 .001 *
9.------ x 2  1.22 1 .28 N.S.
10.------ F (Anova) 5.00 1 .05
and
20
x2 13.67 1 .001
11.------
SL-3 x .66 1 .80 N.S.
Sandler's A 1.18 6 N.S.
SL-4 x2 2.81 1 .09 N.S.
Sandler's A .488 6 N.S.
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Table 3-5: Data for Each Hypothesis
Error-Free Error Significance
Hypothesis # Parameters Errors Operations Rate of Difference
1. 3-position toggle 90 2208 .0392 Not
All other toggle 0 62 .000 Significant (N.S.)
2. 4-position rotary 1 126 .007 N.S.
All other rotary 24 626 .037
3. 5 or more position 24 602 .0383 N.S.
rotary
All other switch 89 2752 .0313 N.S.
types
4. Left side of panel 77 1474 .049 .01
Right side 73 2321 .030
4. Left 34 1185 .0279 N.S.(With Ha Right 73 2321 .030
removed)
5. Ha 43 289 .1295 .001
Other experiments 107 3506 .0296
6. Single operations 25 197 .113 .001
Sequential operations 125 3598 .033
7. S082A 3 221 .013 N.S.
S082B 6 196 .029
8. High similarity 64 976 .0615 .001
Low similarity 86 2819 .0296
9. Upper half 118 2820 .040 N.S.
Lower half 32 975 .032
10. SL-3 100 1933 .0492 .001
SL-4 50 1862 .0262
11. First 1/3 44 761 .055 N.S.
(SL-3) Last 2/3 56 1172 .048
11. First 1/3 13 721 .018 N.S.
(SL-4) Last 2/3 37 1141 .031
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Table 3-6: Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source of Variation SS df MS F
Between .05 21
Missions (SL-3/SL-4) .01 1 .01 5.00*
Within .04 20 .002
Within .06 44
Time Periods .01 2 .005 4.54*
Time by Mission .001 2 .0005 .45
Time within Mission .0499 42 .0011
*p (.05
The significant difference between errors in SL-3 and SL-4 was confirmed. There
was also a significant difference between time periods. This indicated that the
differences were not in the periods predicted in Hypothesis #10. Also, there was not
a significant interaction between time and missions. When the error rates are plotted
as in Figure 3-2, above, the lines converge, but this is not statistically significaht.
To determine in greater detail where the significant differences occurred,
chi-square was used to compare SL-3 and SL-4 for each time period. The results
were:
Time Period 1 p ( .001
Time Period 2 p< .06
Time Period 3 p < .80
Within each mission, time periods could only be compared using a statistic
for correlated samples. Recently, Sandler's A has been shown mathematically
equivalent to the test for correlated samples (Ref. Appendix A, Runyon and Haber,
1970), so this was used. Table 3-7 shows the results.
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Table 3-7: Differences Between Time Periods in SL-3 and SL-4
Time Period SL-3 SL-4
1 vs 2 N.S. N.S.
2 vs 3 p ( .001 N.S.
1 vs 3 N.S. N.S.
The contribution of Ha accounts for the difference in time periods. When
Sandler's A was recalculated without Ha data, the significant differences vanished.
This was verified by testing time for each mission using analysis of variance.
In this case, each experiment was considered a block and the variance attributable
to the blocks was not included in the treatment variance. When the unusual variance
contributed by Ha was statistically controlled, there was not significant difference
between time periods for SL-3 or SL-4. Table 3-8 summarizes the analyses.
Table 3-8: Summary Analysis of Variance for Time Periods
SL-3 SL-4
SS df MNS F SS df MS F
Time Periods .0313 2 .0156 3.12 N.S. .00355 2 .001775 1.24 N.S.
Blocks .0212 6 .0035 .01836 6 .00306
Residual .0605 12 .005 .01719 12 .001432
TOTAL .113 20 .0391 20
Turning to consider the experiments, only two showed a consistent pattern of
errors over time for both missions. Table 3-9 gives the data for S055A.
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Table 3-9: Error Rates for S055A on SL-3 and SL-4 by Time Periods
Time 1 2 3
SL-3 .073 .026 .021
SL-4 .033 .014 .012
Ha varied between time periods, but in the opposite direction from S055A, as
shown in Table 3-10.
Table 3-10: Error Rates for Ha on SL-3 and SL-4
Over Time Periods
Time 1 2 3
SL-3 .069 .257 .208
SL-4 .000 .125 .167
These were significant differences for several of the experiments from SL-3 to SL-4.
Table 3-11 gives the results. Chi-square with x + .2 used.
Table 3-11: Summary of Differences for Experiments
Between SL-3 and SL-4
Difference Between
Exepriment SL-3 and SL-4
Ha p <(.05
S056 N.S.
S082A N.S.
S082B N .S.
S052 N.S.
S055A p < .02
S054 p < .05
In all experiments, the error rate was higher for SL-3 than for SL-4
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3.1.2.3 Summary
The formal analysis of the ATM C&D Panel depicts a situation in which there
is a significant difference between the two missions. Within these missions, the
major changes over time were attributable to one experiment, Hc , which was gener-
ally characterized by an increasing error rate over time. Other experiments tended
to decrease in error rate over time, but this was not significant.
In terms of hardware design, the major significant finding was a difference
between controls and displays. Differences in controls were not consistent enough
within type of switch to show significance. This, in combination with the procedural
and layout hypotheses (high vs low similarity, and single vs sequential operations)
which were significant, highlight the importance of considering designing and
evaluating components or functional sub-units (i.e., an experiment) of a control/
display panel in terms of the entire operating envelope or circumstances.
A primary use of this formal analysis appears to be as a means to focus or
direct the evaluator, designer, engineer, or researcher, to areas, hardware or
procedures, where a fine-grained examination can provide additional insight and
design related information. Formal analysis, thus, is a useful and relevant but
not all encompassing tool in diagnostically assessing man/machine interface in
operational settings.
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3.2 CRITICAL INCIDENTS
A detailed review of the SL-3 and SL-4 voice transcripts was performed.
Mention or errors or other remarks were noted on Critical Incidents Raw Data Score
Sheets, an example of which was provided in Figure 3-5. The example shows
the type of information that could be noted or inferred from the transcripts (the
limits of which have already been discussed in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3).
3.2.1 Determination of Scored vs. Non-Scored Critical Incidents
The Critical Incident Raw Data Score Sheets were being compiled concurrently
with the scoring of the telemetry data, and, at the conclusion of voice transcript
review, an effort was made to arrange the information so gained in a manner that
would permit comparison of the results of the two analyses. The voice transcript
data themselves fell rather readily into the two broad categories discussed in Section
2.3 (i.e., "errors", and "comments" not associated with errors), relating to the
ATM panel. The exceptions formed a separate group of critical incidents from both
missions which related more to hardware deficiencies or malfunctions not directly
tied to the ATM controls and displays or the man/machine interface -- the objects of
primary scrutiny in this assessment study. This separate group was comprised of
remarks relating problems encountered with the environment around the panel
(e.g., low light levels making reading of instructions difficult), hardware short-
comings or failures which affected but were not part of the actual ATM panel, and
remarks exhibiting concern about resource depletion as it affected ATM operations
(e.g., low film supply in the experiments). As assessment of the ATM C&D man/
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CRITICAL INCIDENTS RAW DATA SCORE SHEET
1) MISSION TIME ,j7 - /~- )//
2) JOP# /'iu
3) BB #i
4) EXPERIMENT SL5L/
5) NATURE OF COMMENT (POS OR NEG) ij0;-c-
6) BENEFIT OR SEVERITY (HIGH OR LOW) /&di-'--- -
7) HARDWARE ORIROCEDUURE'OF REFERENCE (SPECIFIC)
is /iiJ -- .
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
Figure 3-5: Critical Incidents Raw Data Score Sheet
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machine interface was of uppermost importance, these non-directly related remarks
were left unscored on the master score sheets. Their repeated occurrence, however,
in conversations about ATM operations between the crew and ground support required
that they be dealt with in some way. While they were neither part of ATM C&D nor
crew-controlled, they appeared to be a logical contributor to some of the difficulties
experienced by the crew during ATM operations. For example, if a filter became
stuck in one position, due to presence of contamination, as occurred on S056 during
SL-3, this had nothing to do with proper operation of the corresponding mode select.
switch or with theproficiency of the crew in operating the panel. It was, neverthe-
less, a distraction during operations and also resulted in loss or degradation of
experiment data.
3.2.2 Reincorporation of Unscored Remarks
Notations of such remarks were separated from the total collection of critical
incidents during scoring, but they were studied to determine to what extent they
may have impacted the man/machine interface. Those remarks representing parti-
cularly troublesome or persistent problems were reincorporated into discussion of
the experiments after the results derived from scored critical incidents (directly
ATM-related) had been prepared for comparison with the results of the telemetry
data analysis.
3.2.3 Master Score Sheets for SL-3 and SL-4 Critical Incidents
In all, 483 critical incidents were scored and entered into appropriate cells
in Figure 3-6 for SL-3 and Figure 3-7 for SL-4.
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3.2.3.1 Scoring ATM Hardware-Related Incidents
Examination of the horizontal axis of Figure 3-6 (SL-3) reveals the level of
detail to which hardware incidents were classified, i.e.,
HARDWARE
* 2-Position Toggle Switch (F-F)
- Night Interlock - Flare Auto
- Camera Power - Grating Reference
- Auto Sequence - BR-AL Det.
* 3-Position Toggle Switch (M-F-M)
- Start/Stop - Wavelength
- Doors - Mirror Position Camera
- Exposure
3-Position (F-F-F)
- Frames/Minute - Grating
- Mode - Detector
- Exposure
3-Position (F-F-M)
- Start/Stop
* Rotary Switch
- Picture Rate - Exposure Range
- Mode - Filter
* Counter
- Grating - Timer
- Intensity Data - Frames Remaining
* Experiment Related Equipment
- Monitor - Pointing
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The cells below these hardware types are divided into two parts by a diagonal line.
Errors by classification code (C, O, I, TD) were entered into the upper part of the
cells, while comments (C+ for favorable; C- for unfavorable) were entered in the
lower part. The hardware-type categories are followed by a column separated into
four parts, where the totals (by experiment number) for each of the four error
classifications (i.e., Omission, Commission, Inversion, and Time Displacement)
were entered. These totals refer only to total scored ATM hardware-related errors
(by general error type) for a particular experiment.
The "Errors" column is followed, in turn, by a column in which were recorded
total hardware-related errors (of all four general classifications) in the upper half
of the cell and total hardware-related comments in the lower half.
3.2.3.2 Scoring ATM Procedures-Related Incidents
Following a separating space, a three-part column was used to record errors
and comments by experiment number and by procedure category, i.e., Schedule/
Instructions, Experiment Operation, and Operational Time Phasing, for Ha, S056,
etc. Again, errors occupy the top of the divided cells, and comments occupy the
bottom.
To the right of the totals by procedure type is a final column in which totals
for errors across procedure type and comments across procedure type for each
experiment are entered into the upper and lower cell halves, respectively.
The vertical axis of the Master Score Sheet lists the ATM experiments followed
by a slot for Experiment Pointing Control (EPC) and General Equipment. (The
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General Equipment slot applies only to the Procedures column.)
Last, a slot for totals of errors and of comments by hardware type and by
procedures type for all vertically listed items is provided.
3.2.3.3 Totalling Incidents in Preparation for Analysis
After the 483 scored critical incidents were entered into appropriate cells on
the SL-3 and SL-4 master score sheets, they were totalled and analyzed for signifi-
cant control/display problems and procedural difficulties., During analysis, the
data provided in the master score sheets was assessed by error total, comment
total, hardware-related total (both broad and specific), procedures-related total,
total errors and/or comments by experiment, and whole mission totals for SL-3 and
SL-4. Emerging trends were charted and examined. Any cell with a value of 4 or
more (i.e., 4 errors or 4 comments) were closely studied. Other cells, although
scoring less than 4, were also studied if they were judged to represent remarks of
substantial value to performance evaluation.
The results and conclusions of that analysis are presented below by experiment
number, along with mention, where appropriate, of important non-scored incidents.
To simplify organization, the results and conclusions derived from critical
incidents analysis are divided by Skylab mission, SL-3 and SL-4. These two broad
divisions are each subdivided into Hardware-Related Critical Incidents and Procedures-
Related Critical incidents. Discussion under both hardware and procedures is
arranged basically by experiment number, with experiments remarked about most
often being discussed first, because of the larger data base for those experiments.
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3.2.4 Skylab 3 Mission
A total of 117 critical incidents found in the SL-3 voice transcripts were con-
sidered to relate directly to the ATM man/machine interface. These were summed
by experiment number (and EPC) and were ranked by frequency of remark. Table
3-12 provides a rank-ordered list of scored errors and comments followed by total
scored critical incidents by experiment number for SL-3. Percentages and rankings
mentioned in the ensuing experiment discussions are taken from those figures.
3.2.4.1 SL-3 Hardware-Related Critical Incidents
S055A
The S055A experiment was discussed via the audio link more frequently than
any other SL-3 ATM experiment, and approximately 66% of the remarks scored on
S055 occurred during the first nine days of the mission.
With regard to scored errors, most of the errors that were recognized by the
crew and ground personnel pertained to the high voltage (HV) detectors. Six out
of the seven omission errors scored under the detectors were noted by the ground,
and these all occurred on Day 228. A review of the scored comments relating to
the detectors was made to try to determine a reason for this relatively large number
of errors. It was discovered that 35% of the HV comments referenced Detector #5,
which malfunctioned early in the mission. These comments were encountered only
in the first 10 mission days.
Though not as frequently remarked on as the detectors, the Night Interlock
and Grating Reference switches were also mentioned. All the errors connected with
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Table 3-12: Rank-Order of Hardware Errors and Comments
by Experiment for SL-3 Mission
TOTAL
TOTAL ERROR TOTAL COMMENTS CRITICAL INCIDENTS
1) S055 19 1) S055 19 1) S055 38
2) Hal 7 2) Hal 9 2). Hal 16
3) S056 7 3) S082A 8 3) S082A 15
4) S082A 7 4) S056 4 4) S056 11
5) EPC 6 5) S054 4 5) S082B 9
6) S082B 6 6) S082B 3 6) EPC 9
7) S052 5 7) S052 3 7) S052 8
8) S054 4 8) EPC 3 8) S054 8
9) Gen 2 9) Gen 1 9) Gen 3
TOTAL 63 54 117
these two components were discovered by ground support. (In fact, 41% of the
errors reported on the experiment over the entire mission's length were reported
by ground personnel.) The flight crew noted that one of the errors that occurred
in connection with the Grating Reference switch was confusion between it and the
S055 Start/Stop switch.
Comments offered by the SL-3 crew also noted that the Raster/Scan counter
was "acting up" and that the Intensity Counter had required malfunction procedures,
but these comments did not include enough detail to conjecture their impact on experi-
ment operation.
H-Alpha
The video monitors were the most frequently discussed hardware on the Ha
experiment. Most scored incidents related to the quality of the video display images.
During the first 7 days of SL-3 ATM operations, the crew commented on the problems
they experienced in efficient Ha operation due to the rapid oscillations and "telescop-
ing effect" they were getting on the video monitors.
Critical incidents scored as commission errors under the Night Interlock switch
were all noted by ground support. The voice transcripts contained several instances
where ground personnel had to remind the crew to initiate this control. Some of the
remarks referred to other times (apparently not recorded on the voice tapes) when
the problem had occurred and attributed the errors largely to the crew's Ha instruc-
tions. The ground reported that a change would be added to the cue cards to avoid
future repetition of this commission error.
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S056
Of the hardware-related critical incidents mentioned by the SL-3 crew on
S056, 45% were omission errors. The largest number of these errors pertained
to the exposure switch. Although a change in position was indicated, this switch
was left unchanged from previous procedures on several occasions, and the
experiment was set up and initiated with the switch incorrectly positioned. The
crew remarked that they later realized the mode was to be changed but that they
had forgotten to change the exposure setting.
Although not scored on Figure 3-6, 24 critical incidents were recorded
noting a mechanical failure of the filter wheel in the instrument. These failures,
when noted, were usually accompanied by crew comments regarding restarting
the experiment and missing data. The crew also noted that the problem distracted
them from other operations, thus impacting not only S056 data but also data gathered
on other experiments which were run simultaneously with it.
S082A
The S082A instrument was remarked upon rather frequently. Experiment
operations having to do with timed operations constituted most of the S082A hard-
ware critical incidents, but with no consistent specific problem area. Approxi-
mately one-third of the remarks (appearing in the first 7 mission days) tied in
with S082A operation were associated not with actual S082A hardware but,
instead, with 1) problems encountered with the Ha monitors, and 2) difficulty
in using the monitors to identify solar features of interest. These comments, of
course, did not represent errors, nor did they conclusively indicate S082A-
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specific hardware deficiency. Rather, the comments seemed more to imply that
the sun was calm and time was lost trying to find some "action".
S082B
Almost half (44%) of the total hardware critical incidents scored on S082B
concerned, again, the Ha monitors, as they applied to S082B operations. Diffi-
culties identical to those noted on S082A were described.
In addition, several comments were made by both the flight crew and
ground expressing concern about the S082B film supply being very low. To
conserve film, many scheduled auto sequences were omitted, with the unfortunate,
concommitant loss of experiment data.
S052 and S054
Examination of the remaining ATM experiments, S052 and S054, did not
reveal any meaningful trends. The possible exceptions were specific, isolated
comments on low film supply, which, again, does not reveal any helpful informa-
tion about the design of the panel or about the man/machine interface, other than
the suggestion that worry about resource depletion may have been a distraction.
3.2.4.2 SL-3 Procedures-Related Critical Incidents
Half (117) the total 234 critical incidents scored on SL-3 involved procedures.
By referring to Figure 3-6, above, it can be seen that the scored cells under
Schedule/Instructions comprised the largest number of these procedural incidents.
Remarks about Operation Time Phasing were of next highest frequency, possibly
indicating that some of the errors scored under the Hardware category (e.g.,
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inaccurate display setting) may ultimately be attributable to procedural problems
(e.g., crewman being short on time, unsure of instructions and making best guesses).
A summary of procedural critical incidents, rank ordered by experiment
(and GEN, EPC), is provided in Table 3-13. Many instances appear in the voice
transcripts in which the crewmen attribute incidents (scored in this report as
hardware errors) to the quality of some procedures. This raises a question as to
whether many difficulties with hardware were not so much an effect of design as
of procedural directives.
Scheduling/ Instructions
About one-third of the remarks scored as errors under Schedule/Instructions
were noticed by the crewmen themselves. Most of their remarks under this category
dealt with what were perceived as ambiguous or incomplete instructions and schedul-
ing or instructional conflicts. Also, many of these remarks included more than one
experiment or a whole ATM pass, which accounts, in part, for the high ranking of
"General" procedural remarks in Table 3-13.
The Experiment Pointing Control (EPC) had a fairly low ranking procedurally,
but this ranking may be misleading. Pointing instruction problems, when related to
specific experiments (such as S082B) appeared to contribute in a large degree to the
rank ordering of those experiments.
Experiment Operation
Fifteen of the total SL-3 scored procedures critical incidents fell under the
Experiment Operation category. Several were attributable to errors resulting from
revised operational parameters. The largest number of remarks in this group dealt
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Table 3-13: Rank Ordering of Procedural Critical Incidents on SL-3
SCHEDULE/INSTRUCTIONAL EXPERIMENT OPERATION OPERATION TIME PHASING TOTAL COMMENTS
S082B 18 S056 3 GEN 9 S082B 29
GEN 16 S082B 3 S082B 8 GEN 28
S054 11 GEN 3 S054 5 S054 18
S082A 6 S055 2 S055 4 S055 11
EPC 6 S054 2 S082A 3 S082A 10
S055 5 Ha 1 EPC 3 EPC 9
w S056 3 S082A 1 S052 3 S056 8
S Ha 0 S052 0 S056 2 S052 3
S052 0 EPC 0 Ha 0 Ha 1
65 15 37 117
specifically with experiment operation, although these remarks were distributed
fairly equally across experiments.
Time Phasing
Of the 37 procedural incidents accrued under the Time Phasing category, half
were errors noted by the crew due to beginning or terminating an experiment or
Building Block out of phase with requested time. These remarks might, therefore,
relate to incidents in the Schedule/Instructions category.
3.2.5 Skylab 4 Mission
3.2.5.1 SL-4 Hardware-Related Critical Incidents
The SL-4 voice transcript data was approached in the same manner as the
SL-3 data. Analysis of both missions was undertaken simultaneously after the
analysts had developed and verified the analysis technique.
Figure 3-7 presents the summarized voice transcript data for the SL-4
mission. The chart is identical in format to the previous figure for SL-3 (Figure
3-6) . The SL-4 mission was 42% longer in duration than SL-3, and man-hours
of ATM operation on SL-4 exceeded those on SL-3 by 70%. Both of these factors,
as would be expected, had an effect on the total number of remarks. In addition,
the SL-4 crew appeared to verbalize more on ATM operations. But in spite of
the larger number and greater density of remarks made by the SL-4 crew, they
did not offer the depth of comment on hardware difficulties offered by the SL-3
crew. This is explainable in light of the fact that the hardware problems were
well known and documented by the SL-3 crew prior to involvement of the SL-4
crew.
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Table 3-14 presents the ranking of experiments by total number of deduced
errors and total comments. As in the SL-3 Mission, the ranking based on comments
does not differ substantially from the ranking based on deduced errors.
The discussions which follow describe these errors and comments, and
suggest possible causes and relationships between reported phenomena.
S055
The S055 experiment on SL-4, as on SL-3, had the highest number of
critical incidents.. Also, the SL-4 detector switches, as on SL-3, contributed the
highest percentage, 39%, of these incidents. This likeness across missions
becomes even more evident when the SL-4 crew's high number of S055 omission
errors is compared with SL-3 S055 omission errors. In both cases, the prepon-
derence of these errors occurred early in the flight, e.g., for SL-4, 84% of such
errors occurred on three isolated days in the first 15 days of the mission. The
major difference between the two missions, with respect to detectors, is the absence
in SL-4 of the Detector #5 malfunction mentioned on SL-3.
Unlike SL-3, the SL-4 crew mentioned a higher degree of concern about
the Grating Position Indicator. This hardware contributed 32% of total critical
incidents on this experiment. Over half of the remarks regarding this piece of
hardware indicated that the crewmen would pass by the desired grating position
and have to either settle for an approximate setting or completely recycle the
instrument. The problem arose out of the mechanical properties of the display;
it counted upward, and could not be cycled backward. Consequently, obtaining
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Table 3-14: Hardware Critical Incidents
Rank-Ordered by Experiment for Total Mission
100%
75% 25% TOTAL
TOTAL TOTAL CRITICAL
ERRORS COMMENTS INCIDENTS
S055 42 EPC 12 S055 53
S052 18 S055 11 S052 21
5056 15 Ha 3 EPC 16
S054 11 S082A 3 S056 15
S082B 9 S082B 3 S054 13
S082A 4 S052 3 S082B 12
EPC 4 S054 2 S082A 7
Hc 3 S056 0 Ha 6
GEN 0 GEN 0 GEN 0
106 37 143
ImE 
__ _ 
______
a correct setting after a miss required approximately five minutes of additional
time.
The Intensity Data display received several comments relating the use of
the instrument as a pointing aid requiring a relatively long learning period.
However, the crew additionally commented that it was a. useful tool.
S052
The S052 experiment is notable for its relatively high number of SL-4
critical incidents, as compared to SL-3. These could not be related to any mean-
ingful trends, however, due to their distribution over the entire SL-4 mission.
The mode select, 5-position rotary switch received 10 of 21 of the total remarks,
all of which were errors. Seven commission errors were attributable to mis-
reading the Pad and three were Time Displacement errors due to the overextension
of the Continuous mode. Of the total errors deduced in the voice transcript
remarks, 23% were detected by ground support. Some comments reporting a
"streak" or "bar" in the S052 display were made; these sometimes interfered with
accurately locating certain features, such as the Comet Kohoutek.
The Experiment Pointing Control, when mentioned by the SL-4 crew as
a specific piece of hardware or mentioned in relation to the ATM experiments
(Figure 3-7 under General Experiment Support Equipment), frequently required
more time than expected to achieve required operations, some of these problems
may have arisen out of the schedule. Often the crew mentioned that pointing
time intefered with scheduled start times of JOPs and building blocks. Another
difficulty commented on by the SL-4 crew which was not mentioned in SL-3 was
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the tendency for the pointing to drift. This condition may have produced poor
results on the experiments operating at that time.
S056, S054, S082A, S082B, H-alpha, Hardware-Related Critical Incidents
Hardware-related incidents were rather evenly distributed across the other
experiments and over mission duration. Some few stand out from the, others,
and these are discussed below.
When looking at Figure 3-7, it may be seen that the Wavelength switch on
S082B was reported to have had some errors. This component is a 3-position
(M-F-M) toggle switch. Interestingly, no errors were reported on the similar
component in S082A. S082A and B are the only experiments having timed modes
which received scored critical incidents on the timer. S056, which received
the highest total number of reported errors on the start/stop switch, had no
other hardware comments recorded other than deduced errors. It was the third
ranked experiment on SL-4 in total deduced errors recorded. The SL-4 crew
mentioned that the frames remaining counters were used as an indication of
experiment status.
3.2.5.2 SL-4 Procedures-Related Critical Incidents
The cell scores for procedural problems identified through voice transcript
analysis are shown above in Figure3-7. A ranking of experiments by type of
procedure is presented in Table 3-14. As in SL-3, the SL-4 procedures account
for a high percentage, 42.5%, of the total SL-4 critical incidents.
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Table 3-15: Procedural Critical Incidents
Rank-Order by Experiment for Total Mission
Schedule/Instructional Experiment Operation Operation Time Phasing Total Proc. Comments
Gen 12 S055 6 S055 16 S055 29
S054 9 S082B 4 S082B 9 S082B 16
S055 7 S056 2 S054 5 S054 16
S056 4 S052 2 S082A 4 Gen 15
S082A 3 S054 2 S052 4 S056 7
S082B 3 Ha 1 EPC 2 S082A 7
EPC 3 EPC 1 Gen 2 S052 6
Ha 2 Gen 1 Ha 1 EPC 6
S052 0 S082A 0 S056 1 Ha 4
43 19 44 106
In comparing the ranking of experiments by procedural problems with
the ranking by hardware remarks, substantial differences are uncovered.
Although S055 continued to be the most discussed experiment, S082B, General
Comments, EPC and S054 also received a high percentage of procedural remarks,
especially in comparison to the low percent of hardware remarks scored for those
categories.
There is a similar trend in SL-3. Most of the procedural critical incidents
were directed toward scheduling of experiments and their instructions. The
crew seeemed to mention most that the instructions were confusing and unclear,
in such areas as the Pad formatting, labeling and wording. Changes in procedures,
"being engulfed with building blocks", having no observing time due to experi-
ment overruns, and "tight" morning schedules were some of the procedural problems
they mentioned.
The SL-4 procedural critical incidents differed highly from SL-3 in the
Operation Time Phasing area in the amount of comments made about ESS (Effective
Sunset) termination. 54% of these procedural comments were on the termination
of experiments at ESS, as compared to 8% in SL-3.
The procedural difficulties on SL-4, in general, appear to be more related
to time than the comments on SL-3. Building blocks were updated between the
missions, a fact which may have eliminated some difficulties. However, the inclusion
of more activities, shopping lists, etc. was reported to have created more time-
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lining and sequencing conflicts on SL-4. Observation periods were used as
experiment periods on several occasions in SL-4.
3.3 COMPARISONS
,Two comparisons are made in this section: 1) a comparison of the results
of the analyses of the two bodies of data considered during this study, and 2) a
comparison of the results of the SL-2 ATM assessment study with the results of this
study.
3.3.1 Telemetry Data and Critical Incidents Data Comparison
While both bodies of data analyzed contributed to the identification of ATM C&D
problem areas, each data source was also able to contribute its own dimension to
the study. For example, the statistical analysis of the telemetry data led to the
identification and quantification of many factorial relationships. Those factorial
relationships, in turn, led to the identification of problem areas for which design or
procedural recommendations were formulated.
The critical incidents data analysis led directly to the discovery of problem
areas, and, while it did not allow any assessment in terms of absolute frequence of
occurrence, it did provide circumstantial insight that aided in the formulation of
appropriate design recommendations. Because of the nature of the two analytical
techniques, it was unlikely that the results would stand in conflict. In fact, they
did not. Rather, the results derived from the two bodies of data tend to be mutually
supportive. For example, both techniques:
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* uncovered problems in event timing.
* uncovered procedural directives problems.
* uncovered theoccurrence of deliberate procedural deviations.
* uncovered many of the same design and use problems.
* uncovered the same kinds of control-related problems.
3.3.2 Comparison of Phase 2 and Phase 3 Results
Of the seven SL-2 study results (Table 3-16), three (Nos. 1, 2, and 4) were
in conflict with, two (Nos. 3 and 6) were in support of, and two (Nos. 5 and 7)
were not comparable to the SL-3/SL-4 study results.
Table 3-16: SL-2 ATM Assessment Study Results
1) The left side of the panel had a higher deviation rate than the right side.
2) Three-position toggle switches (F-F-F) used without a display had a high
deviation rate (9%).
3) Experiment modes that required manual timing by the crewmen were often
timed improperly.
4) Many of the deviations which occurred during operation of S082B involved
confusion with S082A.
5) Building Blocks with several subsections separated by pointing commands
had high deviation rates for the centermost subsections.
6) Isolated control actuations had a much higher deviation rate (21%) than
sequential control actuations (2%).
7) One-g control panel operation is a valid predictor of zero-g operation.
Although the deviation rates are different, the types and relative frequency
of deviations are almost identical.
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Specific comparisons between these SL-2 study results and the SL-3/SL-4 study
results are described in Section 4.0.
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SECTION 4.0
INTEGRATED RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS
AND DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS
This section has three major objectives:
1) to present the study results discussed in Section 3.0 as direct, abbre-
viated statements.
2) to conclude what factors contributed to the problem areas identified.
3) to advance design and procedural recommendations for overcoming those
factors.
In meeting these objectives, the 52 study results obtained from this study are
presented in nine tables, together with the number of the Section 3.0 paragraph
from which they were extracted. Immediately following each table is a discussion
of the factors contributing to the results found and the associated design or
procedural remedies.
4.1 INTER-MISSION RESULTS
Table 4-1: Inter-Mission Results
REFERENCE
PARAGRAPH RESULT
3.1.1.1 SL-4 overall error rate was about half that of SL-3.
3.1.2.2.3 SL-3 error rate was significantly higher (< .001) than was that
of SL-4.
3.1.1.1 Both controls and displays contributed to the SL-3, SL-4 difference.
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Table 4-1: Inter-Mission Results (Continued)
REFERENCE
PARAGRAPH RESULT
3.1.1.1 S054 Exposure Range error rate was dramatically lower for SL-4
than for SL-3.
3.1.2.2.3 Ha 1, S055A, S054 error rates were significantly lower for SL-4
than for SL-3.
All five of these study results can be attributed to the same four factors:
1) differences in procedural directives, 2) differences in task difficulty, 3) differ-
ences in training effectiveness, and 4) differences in ground crew experience.
While no effort was made to verify the correctness of these assumptions, it is
assumed that because SL-4 followed two similar manned flights, it benefitted
from previous experience. Therefore, it should be safe to say that, in addition
to more experienced ground crews, SL-4 was provided with more understandable
procedural directives, less confusing and better arranged tasks, and more effec-
tive training. The design and procedural implications of these assumptions are
clear: Where possible, prior to a mission,
1) Develop an integrated set of well organized, clearly understandable
operating procedures and procedural directives for both the crew
and for direct ground support personnel.
2) Train all crews and direct mission support personnel to use those
procedures and procedural directives, using the highest possible
fidelity integrated mission simulators.
3) Where needed, as a result of the experiences gained in that training
simulation, upgrade all procedures and procedural directives and
train again.
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4) Repeat Steps 1 - 3 until an acceptable level of overall system perform-
ance has been attained.
4.2 INTRA-MISSION RESULTS
Table 4-2: Intra-Mission Results
REFERENCE
PARAGRAPH RESULTS
3.1.1.1 SL-3 error rate decreased across time.
3.1.1 .1 Display error rate decreased across time for both SL-3 and SL-4.
3.1.2.2.3 There were significant differences in error rates between time
periods.
3.1.1.1 SL-4 error rate remained constant over time (revised figures).
With the exception of the third item, Table 4-2 results tend to confirm the
recommendations advanced in Section 4.1. Whereas SL-4 mission performance
tended to remain at a constant rate (thus tending to confirm suppositions that it
received the benefit of more complete, effective training), SL-3 performance
did not. Rather, SL-3 mission performance tended to improve over time. In doing
so, it exhibited a learning/adaptation effect and, therefore, supports an argument
for additional training.
An interesting observation concerning the second result in Table 4-2 (e.g.,
both missions tended to improve in their display performances over time) is that
neither mission crew had been sufficiently trained to use the displays provided
for the tasks performed. Thus, recommendations to rectify problems associated
with this section's results are the same as the Section 4.1 recommendations.
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4.3 COMPONENT FUNCTION RELATED RESULTS
Table 4-3: Component Function Related Results
REFERENCE
PARAGRAPH RESULT
3.1.1.2 Operations involving 3-pos F-F-F toggle switches (mode select
function) were performed less accurately thanthose involving 3-pos
M-SL-M toggle switches (predominantly Start/Stop function).
3.1.1.3.4 Mode selection errors accounted for the fourth highest number of
Table 3-1 error rate cells.
3.1.2.2.1 Hypothesis #1* - Rejected
3.1.2.2.1 Hypothesis #2** - Rejected
3.1.2.2.1 Hypothesis #3*** - Rejected
In this study, no instance of hardware type superiority over another hard-
ware type was demonstrated. What did emerge from this study is that component
function and associated relationships (e.g., panel placement, task sequence order,
etc.) seemed to be more important. This stands in direct conflict with the findings
of the SL-2 ATM assessment study results, which attributed high error rates to
*Hypothesis #1: Three-position toggle switches have a significantly higher error
rate than other types of switches.
**Hypothesis #2: Rotary switches with positions numbering more than four have
a significantly higher error rate than rotary switches with four positions.
***Hypothesis #3: Rotary switches with positions numbering more than four have
a significantly higher error rate than the other types of switches used on the
ATM panel.
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the use of three position (F-F-F) toggle switches. Design implications of the
Table 4-3 results are not obvious. Therefore, certain physical and procedural
similarities along functional lines may help to provide useful insight.
First, the Start/Stop function is always associated with a single control.
Each of these is located more or less in the same position with respect to its
associated experiments. Moreover, each is accompanied by a ready/operate
light which enhances its target value. Together, these physical attributes and
the prominence of start/stop instructions in the procedural directives would seem
to be sufficient reasons for lower error rates.
The mode select function, on the other hand, is served by a varying number
of controls on different experiments. These controls are not located similarly
within their respective experiments. The status displays associated with these con-
trols are of relatively low target value. Further, they need to provide more than simple
"yes" or "no" information. By themselves, these attributes would seem to be cause
enough for degraded mode selection performance. However, in addition to these
physical factors, the mode select instructions have been given a position of low prominence
in the procedural directives.
While it may seem appropriate to recommend that mode select functions be per-
formed by one control, that the control be located consistently with respect to its
function, and, that it be accompanied by a high target value display, these are often
not the best design choices. However, one absolute procedural recommendation that
can be made as a result of the Table 4-3 findings, is that any procedural instruction
to be communicated must be given sufficient prominence in the procedural directives.
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4.4 CONTROL RELATED RESULTS
Table 4-4: Control Related Results
REFERENCE
PARAGRAPH RESULT
3.2.1.1 S055A HV detectors were omitted.
3.2.1.1 S055A grating reference (opt./mech) selector was left in wrong
position.
3.2.1.1 S055A night interlock was left in override (experiment ran all
night) .
3.2.1.1 S056 exposure selection switch was associated with commission
errors (3-pos., F-F-F toggle switch).
3.2.2.1 S052 mode selection caused errors (5-pos. rotary switch).
3.2.2.1 S054 grating position selection was left in improper position
(2-pos., F-F toggle switch).
3.2.2.1 S082B wavelength selection resulted in errors (3-pos., M-SL-M
toggle switch).
Rather than having been concluded from error rates calculated from tele-
metry data as were the results in previous Section 4.0 tables, the results in
Table 4-4 were extracted from the voice transcripts. Because of this, no assump-
tions can be made about their relative contribution to the overall ATM C&D error
rates. Nevertheless, since they were of enough concern to have been emphatically
voiced by the crew or by first line mission support personnel, they will be addressed
here.
Of immediate interest is the diversity of the control population. This tends
to support the results of Section 4.3. Also, since all the controls mentioned in
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Table 4-4 are "components", they are subject to the same recommendations advanced
in Section 4.2. Other recommendations are presented below.
There are seven S055A high voltage detectors (3-pos., F-F-F toggles)
located together on the panel. While problems with operating these detectors did
not appear in the telemetry analysis, failures to activate those that were required
can probably be attributed to the combined effects of three major factors:
1) directive information background, 2) individual control feedback, and 3) con-
trol clutter.
Directive information breakdown is the problem addressed at the end of
Section 4.3. It has equal applicability to all of the controls listed in Table 4-4.
Individual control feedback (visual) is also applicable to all of the controls in
this section, but its solutions are well understood. Therefore, except in instances
where special comment is deemed advantageous, neither of these two factors will
be mentioned again in this section. Control clutter, on the other hand, is a
problem unique (among the results in Table 4-4) to the S055A high voltage detec-
tors. It results from the inability to readily distinguish one control from another.
The problem can be handled by rearrangement and re-marking, but the design
recommendation applicable to control clutter is that similar proximal components
should be made individually distinguishable.
S055A grating reference and S054 grating position status information were
not always included among the procedural directives. Thus, there was no
consistent reminder for the operator to check the related controls. Yet several
instances were recorded of valuable data being missed because these controls
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were left in the wrong positions.
This indicates that there was a need for the operator to check the status
of each of these controls on a regular basis. Where this need exists, it must
be reflected by inclusion of appropriate instructions as part of the operational
directives.
Leaving the S055A night interlock in the override position was another
problem which arose. While the problem is similar to the one just discussed,
there is an important difference. Whereas the grating reference control can be
considered a normal part of the experiment, the night interlock switch cannot.
The latter is a control rarely used and, then, under special conditions, so
instructions concerning its positional status do not rightfully belong in the normal
operational directives. Therefore, if it is inadvertently left "on", it is unlikely
that the error will be quickly discovered. To guard against the possibility of
controls of this category , being inappropriately left on, a cyclical alert (preferably
tonal) should be incorporated. That is, if a control that can adversely affect system
performance is left in a dangerous position beyond an acceptable time period, an
intermittent tone should be sounded to alert the operator of its status.
The S056 exposure length switch is unusual only in that it is isolated from
the rest of its associated components. If possible, isolation of this type should
be avoided. If it cannot, particular care must be taken to include necessary
instructions prominently in the pertinent operational directives.
The problem cited for the S052 mode select switch specifically mentioned
it as being attributable to a misread pad (i.e., procedural directives). Therefore,
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the procedural directives comment already made should suffice here.
Comments about the S082B wavelength selectors may also have been rooted
in problems with procedural directives, but, in this case, there is anadditional
problem. The control (M-SL-M toggle switch) itself gives no feedback, so a three-
position flag is provided for that purpose. If there was a problem with mis-setting this
control, it well may have been due to a display legibility problem. Therefore,
if the need for display feedback supplementary to a control action has been iden-
tified, the designer must ascertain that the required information is faithfully
transmitted to the control user under all expected operating conditions (e.g., low
light levels).
4.5 Hc 1 FRAMES/MINUTE CONTROL RELATED RESULTS
Table 4-5: Ha 1 Frames/Min Control Related Results
REFERENCE
PARAGRAPH RESULT
3.1.1.3.3 Ha 1 frames/min. rate selection errors accounted for the third
highest number of Table 3-1 error rate cells.
3.1.2.2.2 Hypothesis #5* accepted (<.001).
3.1.2.2.2 Left side panel operations demonstrated significantly higher (<.01)
error rates than did right side operations; this effect vanishes if
the Ha 1 errors are removed.
(Hypothesis #5: H a 1 has a significantly higher error rate than any other
experiment on the left side of the panel.
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Table 4-5: Hal Frames/Min Control Related Results (Continued)
REFERENCE
PARAGRAPH RESULT
3.1.2.2.2 Highly similar experiments exhibited significantly higher error
rates than dissimilar experiments (this result is attributable to
Ha 1 error rate skewing effect).
3.1.2.2.2 There is no significant difference in error rates between S082A
and S082B.
3.2.1.1 Ground control discovered H a I frames/min. setting errors.
While it may seem unusual or inappropriate to devote an entire section
to the findings surrounding one experiment, the impact of this experiment on
overall ATM C&D performance measured, justifies the special treatment. First,
Ha 1 frames/min. error rates alone accounted for the first four results listed in
Table 4-5. Thus, if the reasons for the high Ha 1 error rates can be specified,
the mechanism behind these results will also have been pinpointed.
Section 3.1.1.1 attributes all of the Haerrors for SL-4 to an inadequacy of
this study (missing data). This accounts for much of the problem. In fact,
it also supports the assertion that the remainder of the problems experienced
were not due to hardware inadequacies. Rather, it indicates that the trouble
may have had two other sources: training emphasis and procedural directives.
In the first case, it is known that the importance of Ha was minimized
throughout many of the training sessions (because of its relative operating
simplicity and its lack of full experiment stature). Indeed, it is also apparent
that this minimization of stature was carried through all the way to the Ha 1
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operational directives presented in the Building Blocks, e.g., as tiny notations
buried in obscure rows at the bottom of the form. Thus, both sources seem to
have been contributory to the frames/min. error rate problem.
If a similar problem is to be avoided in future missions, it is imperative
that:
1) All mission operations be given appropriate stature during training.
2) All required procedures be presented in the procedural directives with
equal prominence.
Having discussed the reasons behind the large Ha error rates, it is now
appropriate to turn to a discussion of the Table 4-5 results. First, it must be
said that, originally, Results #3 and #4 tended to support the SL-2 ATM assess-
ment's left vs. right side and S082A vs S082B results. As amended by the removal
of Hc 1 errors, however, the results are in disagreement. So, too, is this
study's finding comparing S082A and S082B error rates (Result #4) in opposition
to the SL-2 assessment finding addressing the same question.
4.6 DISPLAY RELATED RESULTS
Table 4-6: Display Related Results
REFERENCE
PARAGRAPH RESULT
3.1 1.1 Both crews performed 3 to 5 times better on. controls than they
did on displays.
3.1.2.2.1 Display operations resulted in significantly higher (<.001) error
rates than did control operations.
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Table 4-6: Display Related Results (Continued)
REFERENCE
PARAGRAPH RESULT
3.1.1.3.2 S055A grating position errors were the second highest contributor
to the number of Table 3-1 error rate cells.
3.1.2.2.2 Sequential operations exhibited significantly ( <.001) lower
error rates than did single operations.
3.2.2.1 S055A grating position and indicator contributed to operating diffi-
culties.
3.2.1.1 H c video monitor and images were of poor quality (rapid image
oscillations and telescoping effect).
3.2.1.1 HC video image and quality created problems operating S082A.
3.2.1.1 3-position flags for S056 filter position proved difficult to use.
3.2.2.1 Experiment pointing would drift off required position undetected
by operator.
Result #4 in the above table is directly supportive of the similar, isolated
control actuations finding reported as a result of the SL-2 assessment activity.
Further, both of those findings are more or less supportive of Table 4-6 results
#1 and #2. That is because display operations are largely equivalent to isolated
or single operations. They are not, however, exactly similar. The S055A
grating position indicator, usually used as part of a sequential operation, is
the exception. Nevertheless, its performance, like that of the other displays,
left a great deal to be desired.
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The detailed reasons for the disappointing performance of the ATM displays
studied was presented earlier in Section 3.1.1.1. For this reason, only a general
overview of the problems encountered will be identified.
All of the first five results can be explained in terms of the effects of three
factors: directive functional breakdown, display target value, and display dynamics.
Results F1, #2 and #4 had directive functional breakdowns and display target value
problems related to timing to account for their presence (discussed in Section 4.7
below) . Timing, in turn, was dependent upon effective procedural directives and
compelling display target values. The S055A grating position indicator results, on
the other hand, from display problem relationships (requirements to dyanmics).
Specifically, the procedural directives required setting the display units digit to a
particular value. That requirement was not compatible with the display's high rate
of incrementing. Thus, an overrun situation often arose, which was compounded by
the lack of a display decrement provision. At least three design recommendations
for eliminating this problem are apparent:
1) Where a digital counter (indicative of a non-continuous control require-
ment equipment function) must be set, a pre-select feature should be
provided. That is, the desired display value should be ordered by the
operator and the equipment should effect the setting.
2) If there is a need for precisely setting a digital counter display, and, if
no provision can be made for its counting direction reversal, then a single
rate of advancement well suited to the task requirements should be
provided.
3) If a high counting rate digital display is required, a variable rate control
with a reversing feature should be provided.
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Both Hcal video monitoring comments pertain to the same problem -- poor
video quality due to rapid image oscillations and a telescoping effect. These problems
can be eliminated if the following CRT monitor design criteria are met:
1) Scaling disparity between expected or reference and primary images
should be minimized.
2) Sufficient image resolution should be provided to permit operator acquisi-
tion of required data.
3) Image pattern and pattern orientation should conform to operator expecta-
tions.
4) Sufficient image stability must be provided to assure operator acquisition
of the information presented.
The three-position flags that indicate the S056 filter position presented the
same problem discussed about the S082B wavelength select display in Section 4. 4.
That is, it was misread. Thus, the discussion presented in the earlier section also
pertains here.
Experiment pointing drift as mentioned in the last comment is another matter.
It can lead to a serious impairment of mission objectives across many experiments.
Therefore, if encountering such a problem is likely or even probable, a suitable
alarm system should be provided to indicate when the monitored function drifts out-
side tolerance.
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4.7 TIME DISPLACEMENT RELATED RESULTS
Table 4-7: Time Displacement Related Results
REFERENCE
PARAGRAPH RESULT
3.1.1.3.1 Time displacement errors accounted for the highest number of Table 3-1
error rate cells.
3.2. 1.1 S052 continuous mode was allowed to run past time.
3.2.1.2 Timed operations information in unclear.
Problems associated with time displacement fell into two categories: procedural
directives and functioning. Together, these problems caused the late starting and
early termination of experiments that required manual timing. This directly supports
the SL-2 ATM assessment finding that "experiment modes that require manual timing
by the crewmen were often timed improperly."
Specific procedural directive problems related to time displacement errors
included: misunderstood voice communications, cluttered checklists, and inade-
quate Building Block presentation of experiment start, stop and span times. These
suggest the following recommendations:
1) Vocally communicated timing directives should be presented in a format,
mutually acceptable to both sender and recipient. That format should be
capable of transmission (via the intended medium) without significant loss
of information intelligibility.
2) Checklists should be laid out to ensure full and accurate transmission of
the information they contain.
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3) A list of manually performed activities should have the point of initiation
for all activities clearly indicated along a single timeline. In addition,
all of the operations important to the performance of each activity should
be clearly presented and time referenced.
Part of the display functioning problems associated with time displacement were
attributable to a lack of target value*. This was true both for clocks (digital and
analog) and for ready/operate lights (the two display types used for timing). Because
both of these displays are dependent upon the visual channel for their target value,
and because the visual channel is often not available, the solution is obvious. If
manually timed operations are required, the time reference display should be equipped
with an auditory alarm.
The remainder of the display problem was attributable to the lack of a dedicated
timing device for each experiment, incorporating manually timed operating modes.
Here, too, the design solution is obvious -- all manually timed operations likely to
be performed in conjunction with other manually timed operations, should be provided
with dedicated timers.
*Target value = the ability to attract attention when competing with other stimuli.
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4.8 PROCEDURES/SCHEDULING RELATED RESULTS
Table 4-8: Procedures and Scheduling Related Results
REFERENCE
PARAGRAPH RESULT
3.1.1.1 Both crews erred in following assigned procedures.
3.2.1.2 Pointing instructions were unclear as to coordinate and permissible
tolerance.
3.2.1.2 Important information was omitted from procedural directives (per-
taining to the S055A Night Interlock, and the Grating Reference (opt./
mech).
3.2.1.2 Nearly all S082B and S054 comments cited procedural ambiguity.
3.2.2.2 S082B scheduling difficulties were experienced.
3.2.2.1 Insufficient time was scheduled for experiment pointing.
Each of the first four Table 4-8 results can be attributed to factors that have
already been identified and fully addressed. Therefore, neither the results nor the
factors to which they are attributed will receive the benefit of further discussion.
Both of the remaining Table 4-8 results address a scheduling problem.
From these and other related voice transcript remarks, it would seem that realistic
time requirements had not been developed prior to the mission for each of the planned
tasks.
If the day to day mission planning is to be scheduled effectively, such time
estimates must be provided. It is, therefore, recommended that during the training
simulations identified in Section 4.1, an effort be made to accurately record the time
required to perform all planned mission tasks.
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4.9 UNRELATED FINDINGS AND COMMENTS
Table 4-9: Unrelated Findings and Comments
REFERENCE
PARAGRAPH RESULT
3.1.2.2.2 There is no significant difference between upper and lower control
panel associated error rates.
3.2.1.1 S055A Grating Reference select control (2-position, F-F toggle) was
confused with the S055A start/stop switch (3-position, M-SL-M
toggle switch).
3.2.2.1 Pointing by S055A intensity data display was effective but required
practice.
3.2.2.1 Frames remaining counters were used to indicate operating status.
3.2.2.2 Dislike was expressed for the use of two control mode select functions(e.g., S054).
Because these results are more or less unrelated to each other, they will be
addressed one at a time.
Finding no significant error rate differences between upper and lower panel
operations complements the no right-left differences picture presented in Section 4.5.
Taken together, these results more or less indicate that, within the ATM panel area
studies, all segments are equally suitable to the control and display operations per-
formed.
Mistaking the S055A grating reference control for the start/stop switch probably
resulted because the two components were adjacent and both were under illuminated
displays. Thus, each of the components had an equal target value that was higher
than that of those surrounding them. Since it is usually the case that only the
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start/stop switch has the advantage of high target value, both components were
perceived as the start/stop switch. Therefore, if a control is intended to have high
target value, that target value should not be diminished by placing a similar control,
equally able to attract the operator's attention, next to it.
The third comment concerning the need to practice experiment pointing using
the S055A intensity data display only underlines the requirement for the high fidelity
training simulations identified in Section 4. 1.
Use of the frames remaining counters, as described in Comment #4, to indicate
an experiment operating status is not a negative finding. It only points out that the
operators want to know more than that they have started the experiment or that they
have selected the correct mode. They also want to know if the mode they have selected
is being performed. Therefore, in situations where such information is not already
provided, it is desirable to provide the operator with the feedback necessary to tell
him in what mode the system is actually operating.
Finally, the last comment was included to demonstrate that crew subjective
comments, while extremely valuable, are not necessarily related to actual system
performance. In this case, the comment was made during SL-4 indicating a dislike
for the dual control mode select operations required for S054. From that comment,
one might expect that an analysis of the telemetry data would reveal relatively high
error rates related to S054 control operations. This was not the case. In fact, during
the SL-4 Mission, S054 scored the lowest (.005) control-related error rate of all the
ATM experiments. Thus, while the voice transcript comments were treated throughout
Section 4.0 as though they were indicative of a serious C&D system problem, in many
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cases, they probably were not. Nevertheless, problems that were only perceived
served the same purpose as the "real" ones, i.e., they focused analytical attention on
particular areas of the ATM experiment C&D system operation and, in doing so,
triggered the development of design guidelines that might be of some future benefit.:
4.10 DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY
Here, in Table 4-10 is a list of all of the design and procedural recommendations
advanced in the Section 4.0 subsections. While reviewing this list, there may be a
tendency on the part of the reader to consider some of the solutions obvious. That
the solutions seem obvious after being stated does not minimize their importance;
they do address problem areas identified as a result of a careful scrutiny of SL-3 and
SL-4 ATM C&D system performance.
Table 4-10: Design Recommendations Summary
1) Develop an integrated set of well organized, clearly understandable operating
procedures and procedural directives, both for the crew and for direct ground
support personnel.
2) Train all crews and direct mission support personnel to use the procedures and
procedural directives developed, using the highest possible integrated mission
simulations.
3) Where needed, as a result of the experiences gained in training simulation,
upgrade all procedures and procedural directives and train again.
4) Repeat steps 1 through 3 until an acceptable level of overall system performance
has been attained.
5) Any procedural instruction to be communicated must be given sufficient promi-
nence in the procedural directives.
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Table 4-10: Design Recommendations Summary
(Continued)
6) Similar proximal components should be made individually distinguishable.
7) Where there is a need for the operator to check control setting status, the need
must be reflected by the inclusion of appropriate instructions as part of the
operational directives.
8) If a control that can adversely affect system performance is left in a dangerous
position beyond acceptable time limits, an intermittent tone should be sounded
to alert the operator of its status.
9) If the need for display feedback supplementary to a control action has been
identified, the required information must be faithfully transmitted to the control
user under all expected operating conditions (e.g., low light levels).
10) All mission operations should be given appropriate stature during training.
11) All required procedures should be presented in the procedural directives with
equal prominence.
12) Where a digital counter (indicative of a noncontinuous control requirement
equipment function) must be set, a preselect feature should be provided.
That is, the desired display value should be ordered by the operator and the
equipment should effect the setting.
13) If there is a need for precisely setting a digital counter display, and if no
provision can be made for its counting direction reversal, then a single rate
of advancement well suited to the task requirement should be provided.
14) If a high counting rate digital display is required, a variable rate control with
a reversing feature should be provided.
15) Scaling disparity between expected or reference and primary CRT images
should be minimized.
16) Sufficient CRT image resolution should be provided to permit operator acquisi-
tion of required data.
17) CRT image pattern and pattern orientation should conform to operator expecta-
tions.
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Table 4-10: Design Recommendations Summary
(Continued)
18) Sufficient CRT image stability must be provided to assure operator acquisition
of the information presented.
19) If important display parameter drift is likely or even probable, a suitable
alarm system should be provided to indicate when the monitored function
drifts outside tolerance.
20) Vocally communicated timing directives should be presented in a format mutually
acceptable to both sender and recipient. That format should be capable of
transmission (via the intended medium) without significant loss of information
intelligibility.
21) Checklists should be laid out to ensure full and accurate transmission of the
information they contain.
22) A list of manually performed operations should have the point of initiation for
all activities clearly indicated along a single timeline. In addition, all of the
operations important to the performance of each activity should be clearly
presented and time referenced.
23) If manually timed operations are required, the time reference display (clock)
should be equipped with an auditory alarm.
24) All manually timed operations likely to be performed in conjunction with other
manually timed operations should be provided dedicated timers.
25) The time required to perform all planned mission tasks should be accurately
measured and recorded during high fidelity training sessions.
26) If a control (or display) is intended to have a high target value, that target
value should not be diminished by placing a similar control (or display),
equally able to attract the operator's attention, next to it.
27) It is desirable to provide the operator with the feedback necessary to tell him
in what mode the system is actually operating.
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SECTION 5.0
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
Because of the scope of this effort, much valuable work was left undone.
For example, many interactions between the Table 3-1 (above) data cell contributors
were not identified. Further, many individual voice transcript incidents were not
addressed. Performing these activities would be profitable in terms of triggering
additional design recommendations.
More important contributions could be made, however, if the data collected
and the results obtained were correlated with other identifiable performance impacting
factors. Some of these factors might include work density (as inferred from general
mission and ATM schedules), crew physiological status (as indicated by biomedical
data), and incidents of hardware failure (from the Skylab mission log) .
A final effort that could be of significant benefit is the preparation of a sample
set of SL-3 or SL-4 procedural directives that incorporate the Section 4.0 recommenda-
tions. The recommendations of this study, together with a set of the present directives
and a set of the revised directives for comparison, could contribute to the effective-
ness of future mission procedural directives.
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